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INTRODUCTION

The Enterprise Bankruptcy Law of the People's Republic of China
(For Trial Use) (the National Act), promulgated on December 2, 1986,1
is the first bankruptcy legisation applicable nationwide in the People's
Republic of China (PRC or China). At the same time, some regional
governments have also enacted regional bankruptcy laws with very limited geographic application.2 The National Act applies only to stateowned Chinese enterprises,' while one regional bankruptcy regulation
applies exclusively to foreign investment enterprises." The PRC thus has
developed two parallel bankruptcy regimes. The introduction of a bankruptcy system in China represents a significant development in the economic relationship between enterprises and the state. Foreign business1. The Enterprise Bankruptcy Law of the People's Republic of China, adopted on
Dec. 2, 1986 by the 18th Session of the Standing Committee of the Sixth NationAl Peopie's Congress and promulgated on Dec. 2, 1986 [hereinafter National Act], repriltedin
Renmin Rebao [People's Daily], Overseas Ed., Dec. 3, 1986, at 4 [hereinafter People's
Daily (unless otherwise indicated, all cites of "People's Daily" are in Overseas Ed.)]. An
English translation of the National Act follows this Article.
2. Bankruptcy Regulations of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zones for ForeignRelated Corporations, adopted at the 23d Session of the Standing Committee of the 6th
People's Congress of Guangdong Province on Nov. 29, 1986, reprinted in Shenzhan
Tequbao [Shenzhan Special Economic Zone Daily], Dec. 10, 1986, at 2 [hereinafter
Shenzhen Act]. An earlier corporation law also contains two chapters relevant to bankruptcy. See Regulations of Foreign-Related Corporations of the Special Economic Zones
in Guangdong Province, adopted at the 22nd Session of the Standing Committee of the
6th People's Congress of Guangdong Province, on Sept. 28, 1986, reprinted in Jingji
Daobao [Economic Reporter], Hong Kong, Nov. 10, 1986, at 31-33, Nov. 3, 1986, at 3435; and Oct. 27, 1986, at 36-38 [hereinafter Corporation Law]. For an earlier bankruptcy regulation by the Shenyang Government, see section IV, infra.
3. National Act, art. 2.
4. See supra note 2. See generally infra notes 271-347 and accompanying text.

19861

CHINESE BANKRUPTCY LAW

men doing business in China will find it useful to have a basic
understanding of how the bankruptcy system works, particularly its impact on the legal and economic status of their Chinese business partners. 5
This article introduces the two parallel bankruptcy regimes and also
presents a case study to illustrate the actual operation of bankruptcy law
in China.
II. BACKGROUND
A.

Economic Reform and the Bankruptcy Law

Development of bankruptcy law in China is part of the overall economic reform launched in the early 1980s. 6 The theme of this economic
reform is to diminish the role of state planning, enhance the autonomy of
enterprises, increase competition among business entities and provide direct economic incentives for improved performance to both enterprises
and employees. The reform has brought the stagnated economy to life
and has been in overall terms a success. While the economic reform led
most enterprises to improve their performance, it failed to prevent some
enterprises from sustaining losses. Actually, the enhanced competition
among Chinese enterprises makes it certain that some enterprises must
fail while most others prosper. An official report shows that each year
about twenty to twenty-five percent of state-owned enterprises sustained
losses." Some incurred losses every year. Indeed, according to the statistics on one Chinese city, seventy-three percent of the enterprises that
suffered losses had such a history for six years or more.' Dealing effectively with the enterprises that sustain losses is one of the priorities in
the economic reform.
For many years in the past, the prevailing practice in China was either to write off losses through state budget appropriations or take ad-

5. See infra notes 352-58 and accompanying text.
6. For information on the Chinese economic reform, see generally J. CADY, EcoNOMIC REFORM IN CHINA, REPORT OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMISTS STUDY TEAM TO
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Nov. 29 - Dec. 15, 1984). See also Huan Xiang,
Zhongguo DeJingii Tizhi Gaige (The Economic Structure Reform in China), Economic
Reporter, Hong Kong, May 20, 1984, at 25-26; Zhong Cai, Zhongguo jingii Tizhi
Gaige Qude Tupoxing Jinzhan (China'sEconomic Reform Achieved Tremendous Progress), Economic Reporter, Hong Kong, Oct. 1, 1985, at 18-19.
7. Cao Siyuan, Zengqiang Qiye Huoli De Falu Cushi (Legal Means That Can Enhance The Vitality of Enterprises - Proposal on the Enactment of "Enterprise Bankruptcy and Reorganization Law"), 11 MINZHU Yu FAZHI [DEMOCRACY & LEGAL
Sys.] 7 (1984).
8. Id.
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ministrative measures against the enterprises. 9 In the latter situation, the
state would either close or merge the enterprise or change its business
operation.1 0 The employees in these enterprises would not be affected;
they continued to receive wages and even bonuses."1 These measures are
what Chinese often call "Guan, Ting, Bing, Zhuan."' 2 As the economic
reform progressed in depth, this practice clearly became incompatible
with the prevailing economic policy and hindered further progress of the
economic reform. The essential defect of this practice was its failure to
relate the economic benefit of enterprises or individuals to their business
performance, which is one of the basic policies underlying the economic
reform. The state budgetary compensation for losses amounted to an encouragement of poor performance; administrative measures such as closing and merging the unprofitable business also failed to impose the direct
negative impact on the managerial personnel and other employees directly responsible for the loss. This practice thus undermined the ongoing economic reform, which provides incentives to economic progress primarily through rewarding success and achievements. As a Chinese
newspaper commentary stated, under this system
enterprises only shoulder profits, but not losses. Where they sustain loss
and more loss, they did not have to bear the responsibility for them. Even
though they sustain a loss, they still try to raise wages, bonuses and fringe
benefits, without having to worry about the fate and future of the enterprise itself.

. ..

Furthermore, budgetary compensation for losses added tremendous financial burdens to the national economy by exhausting a large part of
9. Jing Xue, Jianli Qiye Pochan Zhidu Shizai Bixing (Establishing Enterprise
Bankruptcy System Being Inevitable), People's Daily, Aug. 10, 1986, at 3.
Discussing the practice prevailing before the bankruptcy system came into being, the
author stated:
Some enterprises inappropriately manage and operate their businesses and sustain
significant loss. Their assets are in fact exceeded by their debts and they already
become bankrupt in fact. Under the old system, the policy was to 'protect' and
'feed' these enterprises. The loss of the enterprises was simply written off through
the state budgetary appropriation ....In the past, some of the enterprises that
sustained loss on a long term and consistent basis might be closed, terminated,
merged, or changed in line of business (Guan, Ting, Bing, Zhuan) through administrative means. The workers continued to receive wages and bonus as usual..

Id.
10.

Id.

11.

Id.

12.

Id.

13. Id.
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state revenues.
This practice also became an obstacle to the progress of economic reform in other areas. For instance, one goal of the economic reform is to
enhance the independence of enterprises in business management. 4 This
goal was achieved to an appreciable extent by diminishing the role of
state planning and the control of various local governments. 5 While the
increased independence of enterprises indeed brought about economic
progress, instances of abuse also grew. Some enterprises issued bonuses
and increased other fringe benefits when the enterprise sustained a sub17
stantial loss."6 Various administrative penalties did not seem effective,'
mainly because the existing system did not impose direct financial obligations proportionate to the increased autonomy of enterprises; therefore,
no essential economic deterrence to prevent abuse existed. Mr. Cao
Siyuan, the head of the working group for drafting the National Act,
explained:
Only when an enterprise has to be responsible for its own survival, is
there a need and can it be possible to make appropriate use of the autonomy of business management. If an enterprise has to shoulder the economic consequence of the loss, where can it find money for bonuses? If
there is a threat of bankruptcy, who dares to issue and receive such a
"bonus" to break the rice bowl? Therefore, relying merely on administrative means such as investigation, supervision and penalties does not suffice
to prevent abuse by enterprises. The essential remedy is to allow enterprises to bear responsibility for all the consequences of their business operations. Only in this way will an enterprise not damage its long term
interests for small benefit, and is there an essential guarantee for the
proper use of independence in business management.1"
Another example illustrating that the existing system hindered the economic readjustment is in the area of financial reform. An important
development in Chinese banking practice was the adoption of fluctuating
interest rates to control borrowing and capital investment, as opposed to
the past practice of employing administrative means." The government
14. The State Council issued in May 1984, a "Decision Concerning Further Expansion of Autonomy of Industrial Enterprises", which gave greater authority to enterprises
in business planning, marketing, price, capital, personnel. See Zhong Cai, supra note 6,
at 18.
15. Id.
16. Cao Siyuan, supra note 7, at 8.
17.

Id.

18. Id.
19. Lao Zhang, ZhongguoJingrongGuanli Tizhi Gaige De Tedian He Qushi (Features and Trends of China's FinancialStructural Reform), Economic Reporter, Hong
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was unable to prevent enterprises that were not concerned with losses,
however, from borrowing at high interest rates and, as a result, financial
reforms were impeded."
By late 1984, economic reform already had touched every economic
sector, and it was clear that unless action was taken in this area, the
ongoing reform would be undermined. Beginning in early 1985, the Chinese government began to experiment with a bankruptcy system to deal
with enterprises that consistently sustained loss. A bankruptcy system
was instituted in three major industrial cities: Shenyang, Chongqing and
Wohan and, to a more limited extent, in Taiyuan, a major industrial city
in central China.21 The PRC government also established a special
group of experts to consider the drafting of a bankruptcy code.2 2 On
February 10, 1985, the Shenyang city government promulgated local
bankruptcy regulations, the first bankruptcy law in the history of the
PRC.2 3 Since mid-1984, eight enterprises in the major cities were issued
2
bankruptcy warnings and were ordered to go through reorganization. 'They were informed that unless substantive improvements occurred
within one year, they would be declared bankrupt. 25 Most of these businesses were able to revive and become profitable under the pressure of a
pending bankruptcy order. Only one of the eight enterprises eventually
was declared bankrupt, 26 and even this enterprise demonstrated limited
improvement and became profitable during the period of reorganization.27 The experiments showed that while a bankruptcy system may
Kong, Nov. 25, 1985, at 27.
20. Dong, Tanqiye Pochanzhi (Discussionson EnterpriseBankruptcy System), People's Daily, Oct. 10, 1986, at 2.
21. Renda FawaihuiJianyiGenggai Pochanfa Mingcheng (The Legal Committee of
the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress Proposing to Change the
Name of the Bankruptcy Law), People's Daily, Sept. 5, 1986, at 1.
22. Cao Siyuan, Qicao Qiye Pochanfa Xuyao Yanjiu De Rugan Wenti (Several Issues That Need To Be Studied In Drafting A Bankruptcy Enterprise Law), 3 FAxiu
ZAZHI [J. or JURISPRUDENCE] 3 (1985).
23. Woshi Shixing Jiti Qiye Pochan Daobi Chuli Guiding (Our City Implementing
Provisions on Bankruptcy of Urban Collective IndustrialEnterprises(For Trial Use)),
Shenyang Rebao [Shenyang Daily], Feb. 11, 1985, at 1 [hereinafter Our City].
24. Shenyang Chongqing Wohan San Shi Jinxing Shidian Jianli Qiye Pochan
Zhiduo Qude Jingyan (Shenyang, Chongqing, Wohan Three Cities Obtaining Experience by EstablishingBankruptcy Systems), People's Daily, June 22, 1986, at 1 [hereinafter Three Cities].

25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Xing Pingan, Shenyang Fangbao Qixiechang Pochan Xiuwen (Epilogue of the
Shenyang Explosion-ProofMachinery Factory Going Bankrupt), People's Daily, Sept.
24, 1986, at 3.
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indeed provide further incentive for enterprises to strive for excellence,
its disruptive impact on the economy and society was de minimis. The
experiments also provided important experience for national bankruptcy
legislation 28 by serving as a testing ground for the national bankruptcy
law that was being drafted.
B.

Socialist Ideology and the Bankruptcy System

While the experimentation with a bankruptcy system was going on,
the legal and economic community engaged in an intense discussion of
many theoretical and practical issues surrounding the proposed bankruptcy system. The consistency of a bankruptcy system with the prevailing socialist ideology was a major area of debate. For many years, basic
doctrine held that socialist enterprises could not become bankrupt, and
this was regarded as an attribute that made a socialist economy superior
to its capitalist counterpart.2 9 In order to introduce a bankruptcy system,
a re-examination of the existing ideology and advancement of a theoretical basis was necessary. From early 1985 to the end of 1986, major Chinese newspapers and journals carried a variety of articles and commentaries written by leading economists and jurists discussing this topic."0
The theories proposed merit examination here. One scholar attributed
bankruptcy to competition." x Without allowing enterprises to fail, he
reasoned, competition is only superficial. 2 Since it is already generally
recognized that a socialist economy should encourage competition, bank28. Supra note 1.
29. Dong, supra note 20, at 2.
30. Yin Guofeng, Shilun JianliJuyou Zhongguo Tese De Pochan Zhidu (Tentative
Study of a Bankruptcy System With Chinese Characteristics),5 ZHENGFA LUNTAN [FoRUM OF LAW AND POLITiCS] 53, 53-56 (1985); Yong Rongxing, Lun Pochanfa (Study
of Bankruptcy Law), 6 FORUM or LAW AND POLITICS 12, 12-15 (1985); Dong, supra
note 20, at 2; Hu Ge, Shixing Qiye PachanZhidu De Yiyi (Implicationsof Implementing
A Bankruptcy System), Guangming Rebao [Bright Daily], July 26, 1986, at 3; Jiang
Yiwei, Shishi Pochan Zhidu De Jiji Yiyi (The Positive Effect of Applying A Bankruptcy
System), Jingji Rebao [Economic Daily], July 5, 1986, at 3; Jing Xue, supra note 9, at
3; Wang Yongjiang, Quiye Pochan Zhidu DeJingiiGongneng (The Economic Functions
of EnterpriseBankruptcy System), Economic Daily, July 26, 1986, at 3; Tang Zongkun,
Qiye Pochan Chuli DeJiexianHeJichu (Criteriaand Foundationsof EnterpriseBankruptcy), Economic Daily, July 19, 1986, at 3; Yang Guoliang, Qiye Pochan Lilun Zhong
De Suyouzhi Wenti (Issues of Ownership System in Enterprise Bankruptcy Theory),
Jingji Rebao [Economic Daily], July 5, 1986, at 3; Yuan Mu, Shishi Pochanfa Shi Lishi
De Biran (Implementing Bankruptcy System Is HistoricallyInevitable), Economic Daily,
Aug. 2, 1986, at 4.
31. Dong, supra note 20, at 2.
32. Id.
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ruptcy is not necessarily alien to the socialist system. 3 Another theory
holds that a socialist economy needs to eliminate backward sectors and
enterprises in order to upgrade the economy. 4 A bankruptcy system provides an instrument to attain this goal.3 5 Furthermore, scholars suggested, even if bankruptcy is inherent to capitalism, socialism should not
be prevented from making use of it. One writer stated: "Now some people claimed that the word 'bankruptcy' sounds very much like a capitalist phrase. However, not everything in the capitalist system is bad. We
need to analyze [a bankruptcy system]." 36 He further argued that without benefiting from the fruits of contemporary world civilization, including advanced business management developed by the capitalist system,
there will be no way to establish a socialist system.3
C.

PresentEconmic Conditions in the PRC and the Bankruptcy
System

A major obstacle to implementing a bankruptcy system in China is the
absence of an economic environment compatable to it. 8 A rational price
system does not yet exist, and enterprises do not enjoy complete business
autonomy."' While many enterprises suffer losses because of bad management and poor performance, a considerable number of enterprises
suffer losses caused by factors beyond their control. The price system
forces many enterprises to operate at a loss and depend on state appropriations to survive.40 This is what the Chinese term "loss due to policy
(Zhengce Kuisun)," as opposed to "loss because of bad management
(JingyingKuisun).'4 Many enterprises operate below maximum capacity because of inadequate energy and other public utilities.42 Many en33. Id.
34. Yuan Mu, supra note 30, at 4.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id.
Id.
Id.
The adoption of the National Act was postponed several times, primarily due to

the concern of some lawmakers over the development of a legal and economic environment compatible with and corresponding to the operations of the bankruptcy system. See
generally supra note 21; see also Pochanfa Shishi Tiaojian Shangbu Jiubei Jianyi
Gaiwei Shixing Huo Zanxing Tiaoli (Conditionsfor Implementing A Bankruptcy System
Have Not Developed; Bankruptcy Law Being Proposed to Change Into 'For Trial Use'
or 'Interim'), People's Daily, Domestic Ed., Sept. 5, 1986, at I [hereinafter Conditions
for Implementing].
39, Dong, supra note 20, at 2.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. About one-fifth of the industrial capacity in China is idled by power shortages.

1986]

CHINESE BANKRUPTCY LAW

terprises are overstaffed and operate at very high labor cost levels." 3 Furthermore, the lack of a system to take care of the employees displaced by
bankruptcy might add an element of instability to Chinese society.
To remedy this situation, the Chinese government has taken a number
of important steps since 1985. First, the ongoing economic reform already has begun to restructure the price system, helping to establish an
equal footing on which enterprises may compete." Second, the Chinese
government launched a sweeping labor reform in October 1986 that replaced the old tenure employment in state-owned enterprises with contractural employment, thereby greatly enhancing the personnel power of
enterprises. 45 Third, the Chinese government is considering enacting a
new enterprise law that would further enhance the autonomy of enterprises in business management and prevent undue administrative interference from various governments. 46 Fourth, the new labor reform established a social welfare system which will provide basic living expenses to
the workers displaced by bankruptcy and establish institutions and networks to help these workers locate new jobs.47 Fifth, the government
promulgated a new civil law which expressly accords the status of legal
persons to enterprises and provides some basic policy guidelines on bankruptcy. 48 For instance, under article 48 of the new civil law, the liability

See Well, Energy Plans Shift Focus, CHINA Bus. REV., Jul.-Aug. 1986, at 16.
43. Dong, supra note 20, at 2.
44. Huan Xiang, supra note 6, at 26. The current system basically allows both the
state and enterprises to set prices. Many products have negotiable prices.
45. This labor reform is based on the enactment of the four labor regulations. The
four regulations are: Interim Regulations on Implementation of Labour Contracts in
State-owned Enterprise; Interim Regulations of the Recruitment of Workers by Stateowned Enterprises; Interim Regulations on Dismissal of Employees in Violation of Disciplines by State-owned Enterprises; and Interim Regulations of Unemployment Insurance for Employees of State-owned Enterprises [hereinafter RUI]. These regulations appeared in People's Daily, Domestic Ed., Sept. 10, 1986, at 3.
46. The draft Law of Industrial Enterprises Under the Ownership of the Entire
People of the People's Republic of China (Enterprise Law) was considered by the legislators and will soon be promulgated. The proposed law provides, among other things, the
independent business management rights of enterprises and also provides the protection
against infringement upon such a right. Yuan Baohua Xiang Renda Changwei Shuming
Qiyefa Caoan (Mr. Yuan Baohua Explaining the EnterpriseLaw to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress), People's Daily, Nov. 16, 1986, at 1.
47. RUI, supra note 45; see also section III.F, infra.
48. General Principles of Civil Law of the People's Republic of China, adopted by
the Fourth Session of the Sixth National People's Congress on April 12, 1986 [hereinafter Civil Code], reprinted in People's Daily, April 12, 1986, at 2-3. An English translation of the Civil Code is provided in 34 AM. J. Comp. L. 715-43 (1986). For a comprehensive review of the Civil Code, see Zheng, China'sNew Civil Law, 34 AM. J. CoMP.
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of a state-owned enterprise extends only to the property it is authorized
by the state to manage and operate. Article 49 provides for penalties
against both enterprises and their legal representatives for unauthorized
disposition of assets after bankruptcy.4 9
These measures, once put into effect, will assist in the implementation
of a bankruptcy system. However, it will be some time before measures
can be implemented fully and have an impact on the economy. Futher,
more changes must be made in order for a bankruptcy system to operate
effectively and impartially. For example, the National Act provides that
an enterprise may be declared bankrupt if, among other things, it cannot
repay its debts that become due. Because the ability of an enterprise to
refinance its debts often depends on the availability of a fair financial
market, some significant changes need to be made in the existing financial system.50
For the two years prior to passage of the National Act, an important
focus of discussion on bankruptcy law was whether a bankruptcy system
should be implemented immediately or should wait until a more
favorable economic environment developed. Some lawmakers contended
that unless enterprises are in fact free of administrative interference and
enjoy full business autonomy, "it is unfair for the enterprises to bear the
responsibility for bankruptcy.""1 A commentary published in an official
Chinese newspaper, titled "Enterprise Bankruptcy System Should Come
Out First," rebutted this view:
Without a bankruptcy system, the losses resulting from administrative interference must be made good though the profits of other enterprises, shifting the burden to other enterprises. While enterprises can never go bankrupt or be closed, undue administrative interference will continue year
after year. Implementing a bankruptcy system would force those who are
used to imposing restrictions on enterprises to think carefully... and en-

L. 669-704 (1986).
49. The relevant part of article 49 reads:
If in respect to an enterprise legal person one of the following situations exists,
then in addition to the liability borne by the legal person, its legal representatives
may be subject to administrative penalties or fines, or where the acts constitute
crimes, investigated in accordance with law with regard to imposition of criminal
penalties:
4. [The enterprise has] dealt with or disposed of property without authorization after being dissolved, cancelled or declared bankrupt.
Civil Code, supra note 48, art. 49.
50. See Tang, supra note 30, at 3.
51, Conditionsfor Implementing, supra note 38, at 1.
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terprises facing a life or death threat will also stand up to defend their
independence.5 2
The leader of the working group for drafting the National Act noted
that implementing a bankruptcy system would increase the business autonomy of enterprises, an important condition for an effective and impartial bankruptcy system.a According to him, some enterprises, comfortable under the old system of restricted autonomy, did not favor increased
decision-making power in business and management.5 Those enterprises
prefer, "less power, less trouble and better hours." 5 There is no "life
'
threat." 56
If there is a danger of bankruptcy, enterprises definitely will
endeavor to expand their power without being afraid of trouble or difficulties. 57 Discussing the question whether the bankruptcy law should be
implemented immediately, a leading Chinese economist stated:
Some comrades proposed that bankruptcy needs to be accompanied by
other corresponding developments. I think all the economic reforms have
similar needs. But it is difficult to simultaneously enact several laws and
then pass a bankruptcy law. I prefer that a bankruptcy law be promulgated first and then speed up other corresponding reforms.5"
Another line of argument in favor of the immediate implementation of
a bankruptcy system emphasized the existence of a fair competitive environment within each line of business or each economic sector within a
given georgraphic area. The rationale is that although even competition
in the economy as a whole does not exist because of the lack of a fair
price system and adequate utility supply, enterprises in the same line of
business and in the same geographic area can compete with one another.59 Because they are ordinarily subject to the same price system and

52. Qiye Pochanzhidu Kiyi Xianxing (EnterpriseBankruptcy System May Come Out
First), People's Daily, Aug. 29, 1986, at 2.
53. Cao Siyuan, supra note 7, at 8.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Jiang Yiwei, supra note 30, at 3.
59. Qiye Pochafa Youli Shehui Fazhan (Enterprise Bankruptcy Law Beneficial to
the Development of Society), People's Daily, Dec. 6, 1986, at 3. Mr. Cao Siyuan, the
head of working group for drafting the National Act spoke to the reporters:
Certainly the price and tax system in our country is not yet rationalized and the
price of raw materials is rising and power supply is not sufficient. These factors
result in some unfair elements in the competition among enterprises. However,
this should not affect the implementing of the bankruptcy system.
For enterprises within the same sector and same line of business; price, raw materials'
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system of utility supply, the performance of their managerial personnel
and other employees will be the decisive factor that differentiates the
profitabilities of those enterprises."0 It is therefore fair for businesses
demonstrating consistently poor performance to go bankrupt.
Although some influential Chinese lawmakers favored postponing the
implementation of the bankruptcy system, 6 ' by late 1986 the prevailing
view was that the immediate promulgation of a bankruptcy law could
promote reform in other areas which are of significance to implementation of a bankruptcy system.6 2
D. Drafting of the Domestic Bankruptcy Law
The drafting of the national bankruptcy law started in early 1985.63
The Chinese government established a special drafting group consisting
of experts from the Center for Economic Law Research of the State
Council, State Economic Committee, State Adminstration of Industry
and Commerce, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Labor and Ministry of
Foreign Economic Relations and Trade and other government departments. 6 ' The drafting group in turn established a working group in
charge of specific drafting work and related investigation and research.6 5
By early 1986, a draft bankruptcy law that contemplated major elements
of the present National Act began to take shape. In June 1986, the
drafting group, the Social Science Academy of Liaoning Province and the
Shenyang City Government jointly sponsored a conference on bank-

supplies are basically the same. But why is it that some enterprises make money and
others cannot but lose money? Thus, there is an issue of management and operation.
Id.
60. Id.
61. For an overview on the positions of lawmakers who spoke on the bankruptcy
law, see generally, Conditionsfor Implementing, supra note 38.
62. According to a poll conducted by the working group for drafting the National
Act, among the 924 responses it received from Shanghai and Chongqing, 84 percent were
in favor of an immediate implementation of the bankruptcy law. Nine percent objected to
it. See Cao Siyuan, Guan Yu Qiye Pochan Fa Wenti De Diaocha (Investigationson the
Issues Relating to EnterpriseBankruptcy Law), Economic Daily, June 4, 1986, at 2.
Most Chinese lawmakers were also in favor of an immediate implementation of a bankruptcy law. Daduoshu Weiyuan Zancheng Shixing Pochanfa (Majority of Members of
the Standing Committee Are in Favor of Implementing Bankruptcy Law on a Trial
Basis), People's Daily, Nov. 17, 1986, at 1.
63. Cao Siyuan, supra note 22, at 3.
64. Woguo Zhengzai Zhiding Qiye Pochanfa (Our Country is Enacting Enterprise
Bankruptcy Law), People's Daily, Feb. 5, 1986, at 1.
65. Cao Siyuan, supra note 22, at 3.
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ruptcy law.6 6 The conference was held at Shenyang, one of the four major cities where a bankruptcy system was instituted. Many leading
Chinese economists and scholars participated. The common view among
the participants was that "time has already come for China to implement
an enterprise bankruptcy law." 6
On June 16, 1986, the Standing Committee of the National People's
Congress considered the draft bankruptcy law, but did not take action. 9
On August 27, the draft bankruptcy law was submitted once more to the
Standing Committee for consideration.7 0 At that meeting, law makers engaged in intense discussion on the feasibility of a bankruptcy system in
China. The consensus was that a bankruptcy system would benefit the
economy and should be established.7 ' The lawmakers also agreed that
there had not been adequate experience with the bankruptcy system and
therefore the bankruptcy law should be qualified as "interim" or "for
trial use," in order to allow revision at a later time.7 2 The lawmakers,
however, were divided as to the appropriateness of immediately instituting a bankruptcy system.7 3 The session continued for a week and, because of the divergence of views among the lawmakers, the Standing
Committee decided, upon the suggestion of the Chairman, to defer its
74
decision on the draft bankruptcy law until later sessions.
On November 1, 1986, the Standing Committee and the State Committee of Economy and Finance jointly held a discussion on bankruptcy
law.7 5 The discussion lasted for eight days with participation from over
66. Gedi Zhuanjia Taolun Qiye Pochan Lilun Yu Shjian Renwei Yi fiubei Shishi
Pochanfa Tiaojian (Specialists All Over China Discussing Theory and Practice of Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, Holding Conditions Having Developed for Implementing
Bankruptcy Law), People's Daily, June 25, 1986, at 4.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Renda Changweihui Kai Dishiliuci Huiyi (The Standing Committee of the National People's Congress Holding Its 16th Session), People's Daily, June 17, 1986, at 1.
70. Renda Changwei Hui Zuo Qi Juxing Shiqici Huiyi (The Standing Committee
Holding the 17th Session Since Yesterday) (Xinhua News Agency, news release, Aug.
27, 1986).
71. Woguo Youbiyao Zhiding Qiye Pochanfa (It is Necessary For Our Country to
Enact Bankruptcy Law) (Xinhua News Agency, news release, Aug. 27, 1986).
72. Renda FaweihuiJianyi Genggai Pochanfa Mingcheng (The Legal Committee of
the NationalPeople's CongressProposingChangingthe Name of the Bankruptcy Law),
People's Daily, Sept. 5, 1986, at 1.
73. Id.
74. Renda Changwei Hui Dishiqici Huiyi Bimu (The 17th Session of the Standing
Committee of the National People's Congress Concluded), People's Daily, Sept. 6, 1986,
at 1.
75. Renda Changweihui Yaoqing Youguan Fangmian Zuotan Jinyibu Zhengqiou
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fifty Chinese officials from both the central and provincial governments. 7 6 In the meantime, the Standing Committee dispatched a "bank-

ruptcy investigation group" together with some Committee members to
conduct a ten-day investigation in Tianjin and Beijing, two leading industrial cities in north China. 7 Other Committee members visited over a
dozen cities and provinces to conduct investigations. 7 The Legal Committee of the National People's Congress once more solicited opinions
and comments from various departments of local and central govern79
ments on the draft law.
On November 15, 1986, the draft bankruptcy law was submitted to
the Standing Committee at its eighteenth session." During the meetings,
the lawmakers considered various proposed amendments. Most of the
lawmakers supported the immediate implementation of a bankruptcy
law, although some influential members still insisted on postponment.81
After a prolonged session lasting seventeen days, the Standing Committee
reached a decision to promulgate the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law."2 Apparently, for the purpose of compromise, the lawmakers decided that the
National Act should become effective three months after the effective
date of a separate statute entitled "Law of Industrial Enterprises Under
the Ownership of the Entire People."'8 3 The specific effective date of the
National Act was not provided.
The National Act consists of forty-three articles and six chapters. The
draft of the National Act was intended initially to apply to all enterprises, including foreign investment enterprises and state-owned enterprises.8 4 At a session held in late August 1986, the Standing Committee

Duiqiyipochanfa Yijian (The Standing Committee of the National People's Congress
Holding Discussion to Further Solicit Comments on Enterprise Bankruptcy Law)
(Xinhua News Agency, news release, Nov. 1, 1986).

76. Qiye Pochanfa Jingguo Fanfu Xiugai Zaici Tijiao Renda Changweihui Shenyi
(After Many Revisions EnterpriseBankruptcy Law Once More Submitted For Consideration to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress), People's Daily,
Nov. 15, 1986, at 3.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.

80. Renda Changwei Hui Shenyi Qiyepocanfa (The Standing Committee of the National People's Congress Considering Enterprise Bankruptcy Law), People's Daily,
Nov. 19, 1986, at 1.
81. Id.

82. Tongguo Qiyepochanfa Deng Sange Falu (Adopting Three Laws Including
Bankruptcy Law) (Xinhua News Agency, news release, Dec. 2, 1986, at 1).
83. National Act, art. 43.
84. Supra note 71.
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decided to rename the draft the "Bankruptcy Law of State-Owned Enterprises" and have it apply only to state-owned enterprises and other
business entities.8 5 Although the final version returned to the original
name, article 2 expressly limits the application of the National Act to
state-owned enterprises."' The change in the name from "Bankruptcy
Law of State-Owned Enterprises" to "Enterprise Bankruptcy Law"
(National Act) contemplates the likelihood of future revision to extend
the application of the National Act to other enterprises.
E.

Creation of the Bankruptcy Regime for Foreign Investment
Enterprises

While the changing economic pattern and economic policy in the domestic context has led to the creation of the National Act, the need to
develop a similar framework for foreign investment enterprises was also
present. As in domestic enterprises, competition also made some foreign
investment enterprises sustain losses on a continuing basis and become
insolvent. Although the state did not have an obligation to support them
financially, these insolvent enterprises often had a serious adverse impact
on other businesses dealing with them, particularly creditors. If there
were theoretical difficulties in allowing state-owned enterprises to go
bankrupt, no similar obstacle existed in the case of foreign investment
enterprises. Even the most conservative socialist ideology recognizes that
a foreign investment enterprise may go bankrupt. Further, for a foreign
investment enterprise located in China, most of its creditors are Chinese
banks that provide credit and other Chinese entities that provide supplies. A bankruptcy system would serve to protect the economic interest
of these Chinese entities.
The major policy concern in allowing a foreign investment enterprise
to go bankrupt is the potential negative impact on the overall foreign
investment environment - allowing an enterprise to go bankrupt could
affect the general confidence of foreign investors in the profitability of
investing in China. Actually a foreign investment enterprise consistently
sustaining losses would affect the overall picture of the profitability of
foreign investment in the PRC anyway. Therefore it would be wise to
create a system to expediently terminate the existence of consistently unprofitable projects and thereby improve the overall picture of foreign investment performance in China. Further, a bankruptcy system could also
give a fair opportunity to an insolvent enterprise to revive by protecting

85. Id.
86. National Act, art. 2.
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it from the harassment of the creditors and allowing it to go through
reorganization.
The necessity of a bankruptcy system governing foreign investment
enterprises arose from the very time when foreign investment began to
appear in the PRC. Until recently, however, the size of overall foreign
investment had been small and most of the projects were still in the early
stage of development, a time when most projects were expected to sustain
losses.87 In the last two years, however, the number of foreign investment
enterprises significantly increased, and a considerable number of these
enterprises began to operate in full capacity after completing several
years' construction and preparations. The time came when the profit potential of a business became clearer for both investors and creditors, and
when the earlier borrowings to finance the investment projects matured.
As insolvency within the debtor and creditor relationship became a practical problem, the need to establish a bankruptcy system increased, particularly in the Special Economic Zones where a large number of foreign
investment projects were located.
The government of Guangdong Province began to draft a bankruptcy
law in 1984,88 about one year before the central govenrment embarked
on drafting the National Act. The drafting efforts were apparently put
on hold in 1985 and early 1986 when the central government was drafting a general bankruptcy law applicable nationwide in order to prevent
duplication of legislative effort. In late August 1986, the central government decided to modify and narrow the scope of the application of the
National Act to exclude the foreign-investment enterprises.8 Since the
upcoming National Act would not help resolve the problems of foreign
investment enterprises in the Special Economic Zones, the drafting process of the Guangdong government once more proceeded at full speed.

87. Foreign investment came to the PRC in the late 1970s. The first Sino-foreign
equity joint venture was set up in 1979. The large increase in foreign investment projects
took place mainly after 1983, the year in which the PRC government promulgated the
detailed implementing regulations for the earlier broadly-worded equity joint venture
law. By the end of 1985, there were almost 6,800 foreign investment enterprises established in China; however, only one-third of these were actually operating. The remaining
two-thirds were still at the stage of construction and development. See CHINA INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC CONSULTANTS, CHINA INVESTMENT GUIDE 329 (3d ed. 1987).

88. Schengrendachangwei Jiuxing Huiyi Shenyi Shenzhen Tequ Shewai Gongsi
Pochan Tiaoli (The Standing Committee of the People's Congressof the Province Holding Meetings to Consider Bankruptcy Regulations of Shenyzhen Special Economic Zones
for the Foreign-Relate Corporations), Shenzhen Tequbao [The Shenzhen Special Economic Zone Daily], Nov. 27, 1986, at. 1.
89. See text accompanying supra note 85.
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On September 28, 1986, the People's Congress of Guangdong Province
promulgated Regulations of Foreign-Related Corporations of the Special
Economic Zones in Guangdong Province (Corporation Law) which contains two chapters relevant to bankruptcy of foreign investment enterprisesY0 One chapter on reorganization applies where a corporation is
on the verge of bankruptcy while a separate chapter on liquidation governs where a corporation is dissolved because of bankruptcy. 1 On November 29, 1986, four days before the central government adopted the
National Act, the government of Guangdong Province passed the Bankruptcy Regulations of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone for Foreign
Related Corporations (Shenzhen Act).92 The Shenzhen Act consists of
fifty-nine articles and eight chapters, and is scheduled to take effect on
July 1, 1987. 93 Many of the principles and procedures of the Shenzhen
Act are substantially similar to those of the National Act.
III.

THE DOMESTIC BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM OF THE

PRC

The domestic bankruptcy system based on the National Act and other
related laws consists of six areas: (1) criteria for declaring bankruptcy,
(2) bankruptcy proceedings, (3) meetings of creditors, (4) reorganization,
(5) liquidation and distributions and (6) the social security system. Each
of these areas is discussed below.
A.

Criteria of Bankruptcy

The criteria for declaring bankruptcy, provided in article 3 of the National Act, consist of two elements: (1) significant losses due to inappropriate management, and (2) inability to pay debts as they mature.9 4 The
presence of both factors constitutes grounds for a court to declare an
5
enterprise bankruptY
The Shenyang Bankruptcy Law uses a different criterion. It provides
that bankruptcy may be declared when the debts of an enterprise exceed
its total assets (which include capital, cash and accounts receivable). 6

90. Corporation Law, supra note 2.
91. See id., chs. 4, 6.
92. Shenzhen Act, supra note 2.
93. Id., art. 49.
94. National Act, art. 3. Article 3 provides in pertinent part that: "Enterprises that
sustain serious loss due to inappropriate management and that are unable to pay off
debts that mature will be declared bankrupt in accordance with the provisions of this
law."

95. Id.
96. Our City, supra note 23, at 1. Shenyang Bankruptcy Law provides two criteria.
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This approach was incorporated initially into the draft National Act.17
During the deliberations, some lawmakers and representatives of the
central and local governments opposed this provision. In their opinion:
[M]any enterprises in our country possess little working capital, depending mainly on bank loans. The larger the business operation, the more
they obtain bank loans. This may result in a very high ratio of debt and
assets. This ratio may not therefore directly reflect the business performance of an enterprise.98
On their suggestions, the draft National Act was amended to use business performance and ability to pay debt as the standard instead of a
debt-asset relationship. 99
The first element of the National Act criteria requires a court to look
into the business performance of a given enterprise to determine whether
the loss is "significant" and whether the loss is caused by "inappropriate
' '
management." 10
This provision is designed to protect enterprises that
sustained losses for reasons beyond their control from the reach of the
punitive impact of a bankruptcy proceeding. To ensure a uniform and
impartial application of this criterion, however, a quantifiable standard
to substantiate "significant," a word not readily defineable, must be developed. Some Chinese jurists proposed a more specific standard. In an
unofficial draft bankruptcy code proposed and published in late 1984,01
the head of the working group charged with drafting the National Act
recommended that when the cumulative losses of an enterprise reach
sixty percent of its net assets, a bankruptcy warning should be issued
and reorganization begun. 0 2 This approach was not adopted. Because of
the great variety and significant differences among businesses, fixing a
uniformly applicable and feasible standard was difficult. Nonetheless,
some more specific guidelines, or more preferably, a quantifiable stan-

Another criterion is that an enterprise sustains losses for two consecutive years, with the

total losses exceeding 80 percent of the net value of the capital assets of the enterprise.
Id.
97. Qiyepochanfa Youliyu Guoying Qiye Gaishan Jingying Guanli (Enterprise
Bankruptcy Law Promoting Improvement on Operation and Management of StateOwned Enterprises), Economic Daily, Aug. 28, 1986, at 3.
98, id.
99. Id.
100. See National Act, art. 3.
101. Cao Siyuan, supra note 7, at 7; see also Qiye Pocha Zhengdunfa (Enterprise
Bankruptcy and Reorganization Law), reprinted in Cao Siyuan, supra note 7, at Appendix A.
102. Enterprise Bankruptcy and Reorganization Law, art. 4, reprinted in Cao
Siyuan, supra note 7, at Appendix A.
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dard for each line of business or each specific sector, needs to be developed for this provision to be applied effectively.
Similar difficulties also exist in connection with determining "inappropriate management." First, it is difficult for a court, with its limited
knowledge of business management and specific lines of business, to
detemine whether a given business decision is appropriate. Though this
pitfall can be remedied partially by the assistance of specialists, a practical need exists to establish further guidelines. Second, it can be equally
difficult for a court to determine whether a given loss is caused by an
inappropriate management decision where other factors, for example, inadequacy of public utility support, also play a role. In this situation, the
performance of similarly situated enterprises may help courts to make
determinations.
The National Act provides two exceptions to the above rule. 10 3 First,
public utilities or businesses of significance to the national interest should
104
not be declared bankrupt if the government will provide assistance.
The precondition here is that the government provides financial support
or adopts other measures to help pay the debts.10 5 This provision leaves
discretion to the government to control and limit the scale of bankruptcy
for public policy purposes by economic means other than administrative
measures. It also indicates that the previous practice of subsidizing enterprises sustaining losses through budgetary appropriation will continue
but likely will be limited primarily to instances justified by public policy.
Second, an enterprise that has provided security or a guarantee and paid
back the debt within six months from the date when the petition for
bankruptcy is filed will not be declared bankrupt. 0 6 The two exceptions
apply only to involuntary bankruptcy.107
B. Bankruptcy Proceedings
The National Act provides for both voluntary and involuntary bankruptcy.10 8 There is no special bankruptcy court in China, and the People's Court where the debtor is located has jurisdiction over these proceedings.10 9 Under article 7, creditors may apply to the People's Court
for declaring a debtor bankrupt if the debtor is unable to pay the debt as
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

National Act, art. 3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
National Act, arts. 7-8. See Appendix , infra, for full text of articles 7-8.
Id., art. 5.
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it matures."' Note that although the criteria for bankruptcy are inability
to pay debt as well as sustaining loss due to poor management, the National Act does not require a petitioner in an involuntary bankruptcy
proceeding to show that the debtor sustains "serious loss due to inappropriate management" in order to file a bankruptcy petition. The National
Act seems to set up a trigger mechanism that allows creditors to initiate
bankruptcy proceedings as long as the debtor fails to pay debts as they
become due."' A creditor who petitions for bankruptcy needs to provide
evidence showing the amount of debt, the collateral, if any, and the inability of the debtor to repay the matured debt."12 The court will then

determine whether other requirements for bankruptcy are met. This procedure provides easy access for creditors to courts. The ability of creditors to go to court to initiate a bankruptcy proceeding itself is a practical
mechanism that can serve to compel the payment of debts.
The debtor may petition voluntarily for bankruptcy."' A voluntary
petition first must be approved by the competent department in charge of
the debtor."" To petition for voluntary bankruptcy, the debtor needs to
describe the loss of the enterprise, provide the accounts, and a schedule
listing all debts and credits." 5 The National Act contains some provisions on the procedures to be followed in a bankruptcy proceeding, and
expressly provides that procedures contained in the Civil Procedure Law
shall be used in the absence of the specific National Act provisions."'
After receiving a bankruptcy petition, the People's Court should notify
the debtor, or creditors in the case of voluntary bankruptcy.' The National Act requires the People's Court to make a public announcement if
the bankruptcy proceeding is initiated by the creditor. 1 8 The bankruptcy
law also requires the People's Court to schedule the date of the first
creditor's meeting in this announcement." 9

110. Id., art. 7.
111. See id.
112. Id.
113. Id., art. 8.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id., art. 6; see also Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China (for
Trial Use), adopted at the 22nd Session of the Standing Committee of the Fifth National
People's Congress, Mar. 8, 1982 [hereinafter Civil Procedure Law], reprintedwith Eng-

lish translation in 2 HONG

KONG CULTURAL Co., LAWS AND REGULATIONS OF THE

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

209-226 (1984).

117. National Act, arts. 9-10.
118. Id., art. 9.
119. Id.
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After receiving notice of the bankruptcy proceeding, creditors have one
month to report their claims to the People's Court. 2" When a creditor
obtains the information from a notice published by the court, the period
in which it must report is three months.1 2 a The report must set forth the
amount of the claims, the collateral, if any, and must be substantiated by
evidence.' 22 Failure to report within the time limit is considered a
waiver. 2 On the receipt of the claim report the court separately records
the secured claims and unsecured claims. 2 4
When a creditor commences an involuntary bankruptcy proceeding,
the debtor is required to surrender, within fifteen days of the notice, the
accounts and a schedule listing all debts and credits.' 2 5 If the debtor acts
as guarantor for other businesses, it must inform the parties concerned
within fifteen days after it receives notice. 26
Once a bankruptcy proceeding commences, other civil enforcement
procedures against the debtors' property are suspended. 2 7 The National
Act does not define "civil enforcement procedure (Minshi Zhixing
Chengxiu)." According to the Civil Procedure Law, the phrase refers to
judicial acts to enforce judgements and judicial decisions. 2 Furthermore, after the bankruptcy proceeding commences, payments by the
debtor to some of its creditors are void.' 2 ' This rule does not apply to the
expenses incurred by the debtor in order to maintain normal business
operation.' 3 0
Article 35 of the National Act provides that certain actions taken by a
bankrupt enterprise during the period from six months prior to the commencement of the bankruptcy proceeding to the declaration of bankruptcy are void.' These actions include: concealment of property; unauthorized division or transfer of property without adequate consideration;
sale at an abnormally low price or pledging property as security for the
debt previously unsecured; advance payment for a debt that does not ma-

120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id., art. 10.
126. Id.
127. Id., art. 11.
128. Civil Procedure Law, supra note 116, ch. 4 (Zhixing Chengxiu (Enforcement
Procedure)).
129. National Act, art. 12.
130. Id.
131. Id., art. 35.
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ture; and relinquishment of claims. 32 The property transferred by actions listed above will be reclaimed and included in the bankrupt
13 3
estate.
This rule applies only to enterprises that eventually become bankrupt.
Actions taken by a debtor in a bankruptcy proceeding will not be void if
the debtor is not declared bankrupt because of improvement in its financial situation during reorganization, or through government compensation or other means.""4 Under the National Act, a bankruptcy proceeding
will be suspended upon the commencement of the reorganization, which
may last up to two years.135 If the enterprise fails to improve, it will
become bankrupt at the expiration of the two-year period.1 3 At this
point, the above rule may invalidate actions taken by the bankrupt enterprise two-and-one-half years previously and even earlier depending on
the length of the bankruptcy proceedings.
This rule is important in two respects to foreign businesses in China
as well as to Chinese entities in business dealings among each other.
First, it increases the importance of looking into the creditworthiness of
business partners, because any bankruptcy proceeding that commences in
the next six months possibly could have an impact on the validity of
present transactions with a partner. Second, the nature of the transaction
should be considered carefully to determine whether the transaction is
one of the void actions listed above. Some normal business transactions
could be very close to these void actions. For instance, restructuring a
debt by acquiring collateral to secure previously unsecured debt could be
"providing property as security for the debts not originally secured;" invoking an acceleration clause in a loan agreement could be deemed "providing prepayment [of a] debt not [yet] due.' 3 7 This rule, however,
likely will be interpreted strictly and subject to equitable principles provided for in the General Principles of Civil Law to protect the interests
of innocent third parties and maintain the stability of the economic relationship. 138 Furthermore, this rule clearly is intended to prevent the
debtor from taking actions to deliberately evade the debts to the detri-

132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Article 35 of National Act defines these actions as actions taken by a "bankrupt
enterprise," which means an enterprise that is declared bankrupt.
135. Id., arts. 3, 17.
136. Id., art. 22.
137. Id., art. 35(iii)-(iv).
138. Civil Code, supra note 48, art. 4, reads: "Civil activities must be carried out in
accordance with the principles of voluntariness, fairness, exchange of equivalent values,
honesty and good faith."
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ment of creditors. The intent of the debtor in the business transactions
probably will be taken into account. Therefore, if the actions of the
debtor result from contractual obligations undertaken previously, the actions probably will not be void. This rule might be clarified further
through later revisions of the National Act or the promulgation of related regulations by the State Council.
C.

Meetings of Creditors

The meeting of creditors consists of all creditors, each having one
vote."3 9 Secured creditors who do not waive their priority rights are not
included in the meeting. 40 The guarantors of the debtor who have rendered performance on behalf of the debtor are considered creditors and
may participate in meetings.'"4 The People's Court appoints a chairman
43
42
of the meeting from among the creditors.' The legal representative"
of the debtor is required to observe meetings and answer inquiries of the
creditors."4

The National Act empowers the meeting to review the proof of claims
to determine the amount of the claim and whether a given claim is secured. 4 5 The National Act also authorizes the meeting to consider and
adopt "conciliation agreement[s]" with the debtor to restructure the debt,

139. National Act, art. 13. See Appendix, infra, for full text of article 13.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. "Legal representative" is a translation of Chinese FadingDaibiaoren.The Supreme People's Court's ruling defines FadingDaibiaorenas "major executive or adminstrative personnel in charge of enterprises, institutions, government agencies, associations,
and other economic organizations." The ruling further explains that FadingDaibiaoren
primarily refers to three types of persons:
1) top executive, i.e., head of a factory, chairman of the Board of Directors, or where
there is no chairman, the president;
2) where the top executive of an entity is not present, vice-president or persons at the
same level who take charge of the business operation; and
3) where the positions of executives are not clear, the person who is actually in charge
of the business operations.
The ruling further provides that other persons in the enterprise may not be Fading
Daibiaoren.See Opinions of the Supreme People's Court on Implementing Civil Procedure Law (For Trial Use) in The Trial of Economic Cases (Sept. 17, 1984), reprinted
in Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Gongbao (Supreme People's Court Bulletin), June 20, 1985,
at 16.
144. National Act, art. 13.
145. Id., art. 15.
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and the plan for liquidation and distribution of the bankrupt estate. 146
The meeting may pass resolutions by a simple majority vote of the creditors present, 147 but the amount of claims represented by the vote must be
more than half of the total unsecured claims.1 48 The resolution concerning the "conciliation agreement" must be supported by creditors representing at least two-thirds of the total unsecured claims. 4 9
The requirement for a "simple majority vote" as one of the two conditions for the meeting of the creditors to take actions allows creditors representing claims of insignificant amounts to block the decision-making of
the meeting. An example of this is where there are five creditors, one
representing ninety-six percent of the total unsecured claims with the
rest representing the other four percent. Under this system, three creditors representing only three percent of the total unsecured claims have
enough power to prevent adoption of any resolution. The National Act
does not provide remedies for the situation where creditors with large
claims are prevented from adopting resolutions in their own interest, but
this system seems to prevent creditors with large claims from abusing the
process by forcing the meeting to act to the detriment of the creditors
with only small claims.
The People's Court convenes the first meeting. 50 Other meetings may
be held upon the initiatives of the People's Court, the chairman of the
meeting, the liquidation group or the creditors representing twenty-five
percent or more of the total claims.15 1 A resolution of the meeting binds
all creditors.15 1 Creditors who oppose the resolutions on the ground of a
violation of the law may petition the People's Court for a determination
within seven days from the date of the resolution.' 53
D.

Reorganization

Under the National Act, during the bankruptcy proceeding against the
debtor, the competent department in charge of the debtor may petition
the People's Court for reorganization. The petition for reorganization

146.

Id. Note that "conciliation agreement" is a translation of the Chinese phrase

Hejie Xieyi.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id., art. 16. See Appendix, infra, for full text of article 16.

Id.
Id.
Id., art. 14.
Id.
Id., art. 16.
Id.
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must be filed within three months after the court has received the case. 15
This provision applies only to the involuntary bankruptcy proceeding,
that is, the proceeding initiated by the petition of creditors. 5 5 The maximum period for reorganization is two years.15 ' Although the reorganization is based on petition, the National Act does not provide the authority
to the People's Court to reject the petition or the right of creditors to
challenge the petition.
After the petition for reorganization is filed, the debtor should propose
a conciliation agreement to the meeting.1 57 The National Act does not
define or provide for further requirements on the conciliation agreement.
Presumably, the basic objective of the agreement is to restructure the
debt to allow the debtor an opportunity to prosper. The National Act
requires that the agreement provide the date of maturity of the debt and
be confirmed by the court. 5 The court then makes a public announcement of reorganization and suspends the bankruptcy proceeding.1 59 The
conciliation agreement takes effect on the date of public announcement. 160 The National Act does not provide a remedy where the debtor
and creditors fail to reach a conciliation agreement. Whether the court
will go ahead to declare bankruptcy or impose a conciliation agreement
that the court considers reasonable is unclear.
The reorganization is in control of the competent department in
charge of the debtor."6 The National Act requires the department to
propose a reorganization plan to be discussed by an assembly of the employees' representatives.1 62 This provision was not in early drafts of the
National Act 6 ' and was added at the last session of the Standing Committee.' " The department must also inform the meeting of the creditors
16 5
of the progress of the reorganization on a regular basis.
After reorganization, if the debtor can pay off the debt in accordance
with the conciliation agreement, the People's Court should terminate the

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id., art. 17.
Id.
Id.
Id., art. 18.
Id.
Id., art. 19.
Id.
Id., art. 20.
Id.
Daduoshu Weiyuan Zanchang Shixing Pochanfa, supra note 62, at 1.
Id.
National Act. art. 20.
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bankruptcy proceeding and make a public announcement.166 If the
debtor is unable to pay off the debt, upon the expiration of the two-year
reorganization period, the People's Court will declare the debtor bankrupt and will notify the creditors to reschedule the claims. 167 Upon the
petition of the meeting of the creditors, the People's Court has the power
to terminate reorganization at any time during the two-year reorganization period if the debtor fails to comply with the conciliation agreement
or its financial situation continues to deteriorate. 6 8 Furthermore, if a
debtor in reorganization takes certain action that seriously damages the
interest of creditors, the People's Court may terminate the reorganization
and declare the debtor bankrupt.16 9
E. Liquidation and Distribution
Upon the declaration of bankruptcy, the People's Court will establish
a liquidation group within fifteen days to take over the bankrupt enterprise. ' 7 The group consists of representatives from the competent department in charge of the debtor, governmental departments in charge of
finance, and other departments and agencies.1 7 ' The group also includes
specialists in the pertinent line of business.172 The People's Court appoints members of the group, 73 which answers and reports its work to
the People's Court.174
The liquidation group has full power to care for, liquidate, dispose of
and distribute the bankrupt estate, 7 5 a function similar to that of a trustee in United States bankruptcy proceedings. The debtors of the bankrupt enterprises may render their payment only to the group. 1 7 6 The
group may determine whether or not to perform the executory contracts
of the bankrupt enterprise.17 7 When a termination of a contract by the
group results in losses to the other party to the contract, the party affected may raise bankruptcy claims against the bankrupt estate in an

166.
167.
168.
169.

Id., art. 22. See Appendix, infra, for full text of article 22.
Id.
Id., art. 21(i)-(ii).
Id.; see also id., art. 35.

170. Id., art. 24.
171.

Id.; see infra notes 249-51 and accompanying text for discussions on a similar

organization in Shenyang.
172.
173.

National Act, art. 24.
Id.

174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id., art. 25.
177. Id., art. 26.
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amount equal to the damages."' 8
The bankruptcy estate consists of three kinds of property: (1) all the
assets the bankrupt enterprise managed and operated at time of bankruptcy; (2) assets acquired by the bankrupt enterprise; and (3) other
property rights of the bankrupt enterprise.1 79 The state is the owner of
the bankrupt enterprise and the enterprise itself only has the right of
management and operation. The assets "managed and operated" by the
bankrupt enterprise refers to the property under its control for business
operations. This provision is consistent with article 49 of the General
Principles of Civil Law which provides that the liability of a legal person for a state-owned enterprise extends to the property he manages and
operates.18 0 The bankrupt estate does not include the assets that were
amount
used as collateral."8 The part of the collateral that exceeds the
182
estate.
bankrupt
the
of
part
is
however,
debt,
of the secured
The bankruptcy estate does not include property that is in the possession of the bankrupt enterprise but that does not belong to it. Under
article 29, the owner may recover such property from the liquidation
group without following the liquidation procedure.' 8 3 This apparently
allows the owner to reclaim the property prior to the distribution of the
bankrupt estate. The National Act, however, does not provide a standard
by which such property may be distinguished from other claims. It
seems, however, that property leased to the bankrupt enterprise falls
within this category. Bank loans may not be recovered from the cash
possessed by the company as "property that does not belong to the enterprise," and neither may property sold to the debtor if the purchase price
has not yet been paid. The test in this context is probably where title is
vested.
Bankrupt claims include unsecured debts of the bankrupt enterprise
and secured debts when the secured creditor has relinquished its priority
right.18 4 The expenses incurred by creditors for the bankruptcy proceedings may not be considered claims.18 5 The debts of a bankrupt enterprise
that do not mature at time of bankruptcy are considered due and as
scheduled claims.1 88 If a creditor is indebted to the bankrupt enterprise,

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id.
Id., art. 28.
Civil Code, supra note 48, art. 49.
National Act, art. 28.
Id.
Id., art. 29.
Id., art 30.
Id.
Id., art. 31.

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

710

[1,6l. 19.683

the debtor can offset the creditor's debts against the creditor's claims
prior to the liquidation.187 If the debt owed to a secured creditor by a
bankrupt enterprise exceeds the amount of collateral, the excess is
treated as an ordinary bankrupt claim. 88
The secured creditor will be paid first in the liquidation from the collateral.1 8 9 The bankruptcy expenses then are paid out of the bankruptcy
estate.190 Bankruptcy expenses include: (1) expenses for the administration and distribution of the bankrupt estate, including expenses for hiring experts for the administration of the estate; (2) the litigation costs of
the bankruptcy proceedings; and (3) other expenses incurred in the
bankruptcy proceedings for the common interests of creditors. 1 The
National Act does not contain provisions that distinguish these three expenses; therefore, these expenses likely have the same priority. If the
bankrupt estate is not sufficient for the payment of these bankruptcy expenses, the People's Court will terminate the bankruptcy proceedings. 92
The next step is the distribution among the unsecured creditors. The
liquidation group proposes a distribution plan to be considered and approved by the meeting of the creditors, 93 and then reported to the People's Court for a decision before its implemenation 94 After satisfying
bankruptcy expenses, the rest of the estate is distributed in the following
order of priority in accordance with the distribution plan: (1) employees'
wages and labour insurance; (2) taxes; and (3) claims of creditors.' 95 If
the estate is not adequate to satisfy claims of the same priority, the distribution is divided pro rata among the claimants. 98 Upon the completion of the distribution, the bankruptcy proceeding terminates and the
liquidation group reports to the registration department of the govern1 97
ment to cancel the business registration of the bankrupt enterprise.
One purpose of the National Act is to penalize enterprises for poor
performance along with those who are responsible for it in order to provide incentives for economic progress. To achieve this goal, the National
Act provides that the "supervisory . . . and auditing departments" and

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Id.,
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Id.
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Id.
Id.
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art. 33.
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the accounting departments of the government shall investigate and determine the responsibility for the enterprise's failure.19 When the leaders of the enterprise are primarily responsible, administrative penalties
will be imposed on them. 99 If the bankruptcy results from a poor decision or interference of a higher-level supervisory department, the person
directly responsible is subject to administrative penalties.20 0 The National Act also incorporates article 187 of the Criminal Law and provides that if a person in charge causes significant damage to the state
property through negligence, he may be sentenced to up to five years
imprisonment.2 01 The Ministry will set up departments in various
parts20 2 of China to oversee government officials, including leaders in
state-owned enterprises.20 3 The penalty provisions of the National Act
will be strengthened further by the "Law of Industrial Enterprises
Under the Ownership of the Entire People" to be enacted as a part of
the implementation package of the National Act.204 The draft of this
enterprise law imposes specific administrative, economic and criminal
penalties on the leaders of enterprises who have caused significant loss to
enterprises. 2 0 5 As in the National Act, it also provides for penalties and
liabilities against higher-level government officials whose instructions or

198. Id., art. 42.
199. Id.
200. Id.The "supervisory... and auditing departments (JianchaBumen)" provided
in the National Act refer to a system to be established nationwide and headed by a
"Ministry of Supervision and Investigation."
201. See id.; see also Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China, art. 187,
adopted on Jul. 1, 1979 by the second session of the Fifth National People's Congress,
reprinted in English in 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 138 (1982).
202. Zhongguo Jiang Sheli Jianchabu (China Will Establish Ministry of Supervision and Investigation) (Xinhua News Agency, news release, Nov. 27, 1986). The report reads:
The Premier of the State Council, Zhao Ziyang, submitted a bill today to the 18th
Session of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress to establish
the Ministry of the Supervision and Investigation of the People's Republic of
China.
According to this bill, the State Council will set up the Ministry of Supervision
and Investigation and regional governments at the county level or above will set up
corresponding supervisory and investigatory departments.
203. Id. Vice Premier Qiao Shi explained that the tasks of the supervisory and investigatory departments include but are not limited to: (1) investigation and supervision
of the implementation of state policies and laws; and (2) imposition of administrative
penalties on those violating the state policies, laws and disciplines.
204. Qiyefa Ying Jinkuai Shenyi Tongguo (EnterprisesLaw Should be Considered
and Passed As Soon As Possible) (Xinhua News Agency, news release, Nov. 21, 1986).
205. Id.
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interference have resulted in significant losses to businesses. 20 6
After liquidation and distribution, the enterprise will cease to exist.
The former workers will become unemployed and be covered by a social
security system under which they may receive only an allowance for living expenses for a limited period of time or until they find another
job.207 Thus, the economic interest of the workers will be related directly
to the fate of the enterprises and compel employees to work hard to prevent bankruptcy.
Chinese practice ordinarily distinguishes Zhigong (workers) from
Ganbu (cadres). The latter usually refers to the managerial personnel.
Under article 4 of the National Act, workers lose their jobs upon bankruptcy, 0°8 but it is unclear whether the cadres will suffer the same fate.
In practice, when an enterprise is in trouble, the leader usually is transferred and a new leader is appointed. If the leader of an enterprise
would have to become unemployed if the enterprise went bankrupt, few
people would lBe interested in assuming a position in an enterprise having problems. This probably explains why the National Act left this issue open.
The prevailing view, however, seems to oppose any special treatment
for leaders. According to a poll conducted by the working group for
drafting the National Act, ninety-five percent preferred that leaders of a
bankrupt enterprise be subject to unemployment as well.2"' Because
leaders are in charge of daily management of the enterprise, it is essential to exert pressure on them as in the case of other employees. In addition, they participate directly in the decision-making and policy implementation of the enterprise. They bear greater responsibility for the poor
performance of the enterprises than ordinary workers and therefore
should not be immune from the consequences of bankruptcy. Thus, the
National Act should make it clear that the cadres have to shoulder the
punitive impact of the bankruptcy as well.
F. Social Security System
A major concern of Chinese lawmakers in enacting a bankruptcy system is how to take care of workers displaced by a bankruptcy. Without a
fair and effective system, displaced workers could become an element of
instability within society, undermining the established social order. The
draft National Act contained a special chapter concerning the placement
206.
207.
208.
209.

See National Act, art. 4. For a detailed discussion, see section III.F, infra.
National Act, art. 4.
Id.
Cao Siyuan, supra note 62, at 2.
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and welfare of the workers of bankrupt enterprises.21 ° Legislation passed
during the drafting of the Act rendered this chapter unneccesary. On
July 12, 1986, the State Council launched an important labor reform
which provided much greater discretion to state-owned enterprises to
hire and dismiss employees. 2 1' In anticipation that the reform would
lead to unemployment on a regular basis, the State Council enacted, as
part of the reform package, the Interim Provisions on Unemployment
Insurance of Employees of State-Owned Enterprises (RUI) which set up
a social security system to provide for those who become unemployed
either because of resignation, dismissal or bankruptcy. Because RUI is
basically identical to the chapter of the draft National Act governing the
social security system, the chapter was removed. An article was added to
the draft National Act providing that "the state shall appropriately handle the living expenses of the workers in a bankrupt enterprise, and the
State Council shall separately make specific provisions."2 2 This provision was revised further to be incorporated into article 4 of the National
Act, which obligates the state to guarantee the basic needs for living to
the workers of a bankrupt enterprise and to provide various assistance
213
for them to locate new jobs.
RUI sets up an Unemployment Insurance Fund (Fund) which consists of three items: (1) a payment by the enterprise equivalent to one
percent of the total payroll of the workers hired through contracts; (2)
the interest accruing on the balance of the Fund; and (3) local government appropriations." 4 The Fund is in the charge of the labor service
company established under RUI as an affiliate of the local labor administrative agencies. 21 5 RUI authorizes the Ministry of Labor and the
Ministry of Finance jointly to enact the rules for the administration of
the Fund. 6 RUI also states that regional government appropriation
shall provide support when the Fund is inadequate. 1
The Fund grants unemployment compensation to workers who become unemployed because of bankruptcy, reorganizations, dismissal, or
termination of their employment contract. 21 8" The Fund provides medical

210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

This part was provided in chapter 6 of the draft Act prior to August 1986.
See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
See supra note 97.
National Act, art. 4.
RUI, supra note 45, art. 3.
Id., art. 12.
Id., art. 4.
Id.
Id., art. 6.
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expenses during the period of unemployment. 2 9 The Fund also covers
expenses for managing the Fund, training the unemployed, encouraging
the unemployed to provide self-help, and compensating for funerals and
other related expenses of former employees of a bankrupt or reorganized
enterprise.2 20 The unemployment compensation is based on the average
wages of the person for the two-year period preceding the unemployment,221 and is provided until the worker becomes employed or reaches
the maximum compensation period.22 2 The amount of compensation for
the first twelve months is sixty to seventy-five percent of the average
2 23
wages and the amount for the following twelve months is fifty percent.
The duration of payment is based on seniority. Persons with a history of
employment for five years or more have a compensation period of
twenty-four months.224 For persons with an employment history of less
2 25
than five years, the maximum compensation period is twelve months.
The payment of compensation will cease if the recipient twice declines,
without justification, employment offered by the pertinent agencies or the
recipient commits a crime and is imprisoned under the criminal law.22 6
IV.

THE FIRST BANKRUPTCY CASE IN THE PRC: SHENYANG
EXPLOSION-PROOF EQUIPMENT FACTORY

Since early 1985, the Chinese government has experimented with a
bankruptcy system in some selected regions. A bankruptcy system was
first instituted and most systematically implemented in Shenyang. In
February 1985, the Shenyang city government promulgated "Provisions
on Bankruptcy of Urban Collective Industrial Enterprises (For Trial
Use)" (PB). 227 The PB consists of twenty articles which broadly outline
a basic bankruptcy framework, substantially similar to the National
Act, 2 8 though differing in some respects.
One difference between the PB and the National Act is that the PB
uses different criteria for determining bankruptcy. Under the PB, if the
debts of an enterprise exceed its total assets, or the enterprise sustained a

219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id., art. 7.

222. Id.
223.
224.
225.
226.

Id.

227.

Our City, supra note 23, at 1.
Id.

228.

Id.
Id.
Id., art. 9.
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loss consecutively for two years totaling over eighty percent of its net
capital investment, an enterprise is considered to have reached the level
of bankruptcy.22 9 Unless it improves its financial situation within a year
through reorganization, it will be declared bankrupt.2 30 The Shenyang
city government announced on August 3, 1985 that three enterprises already reached the level of bankruptcy and issued "bankruptcy warnings"
and orders of reorganization. 3 1
Shenyang Explosion-Proof Equipment Factory (SEF) was one of the
three enterprises. By 1985 the enterprise's cumulative loss was 490,000
yuan and its debts amounted to 492,000 yuan, while the total assets of
SEF in book value were only about 300,000 yuan."2 After one year of
reorganization, the other two enterprises began to show improvement
while the financial situation of SEF continued to deteriorate.2 3 On August 3, 1986, one year after the bankruptcy warning was issued, the
Shenyang government, upon the request of creditors, declared that SEF
was bankrupt and revoked its business license. 2 SEF thus became the
first enterprise declared bankrupt in the history of the People's Republic
of China.23 5
SEF failed primarily because of poor management. According to a report from an official Chinese newspaper, the managerial personnel of
SEF had little knowledge of basic management skills.23 6 A former top
executive had served two years in prison for theft. 3 7 Allegedly, management was more concerned with personal gains than with the interest of
SEF. 8 While the company was suffering losses and workers were laid
off, the management continued to receive bonuses every month in an

229. Id.
230. Id.
231. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.

232. Shenyang Fangbao Qixie Chang Xuangao Pochan (Shenyang Explosion-Proof
Equipment Factory DeclaredBankrupt), People's Daily, July 25, 1986, at 1 [hereinafter Shenyang Explosion-Prooj]. These statistics are cited differently in other news reports. Another report stating that the total debts of SEF is 503,000 yuan. See Xinhua
News Agency, news release, Sept. 25, 1986. Less than a month later, the same news
agency issued another release stating that the debts of the SEF were 423,900 yuan. Note:
one dollar equals about 3.73 yuan in accordance with the current official exchange rate.
People's Daily, March 14, 1987, at 3.
233. Three Cities, supra note 24 at 1.

234. Shenyang Explosion-Proof,supra note 232, at 1.
235.

Id.

236. Shenyang Fangbao Qixie Chang Weihe Pochang (Why SEF Is Going Bankrupt), People's Daily, Aug. 7, 1986, at 3.
237. Id.
238. Id.
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amount equivalent to about seven to twelve percent of their regular
2 40
monthly pay.23 9 The poor quality of the work force was also a factor.
Under the old labor system enterprises did not have the freedom to directly hire and dismiss workers. SEF was forced to hire five mentallyretarded persons who could not work and paid them the same wages as
other workers.24 1 None of the employees had a college education.2 42
Under the practice prevailing in the past, if the enterprise that suffered loss was a state-owned enterprise, the government would compensate for the loss through state budgetary appropriation.2 4 3 For enterprises under collective ownership like SEF, the government ordinarily
provided no direct financial assistance. Borrowing from banks and assistance from other healthy businesses were the major means to keep the
enterprise alive. In March 1985, an administrative order assigned SEF
to the "custody" of Shenyang No. 3 Car Factory (SCF), a profitable
company. 24" SCF was asked to provide direct financial assistance in the
guise of business transactions. Although SCF did not need workers, SEF
sent fourteen workers to SOF to provide "services" and was paid 120
yuan monthly for each.245 SEF also processed components for SCF, and
charged a fee ten times that which SCF ordinarily would incur.24 The
result was that SOF bore an unfair financial burden while SEF continued to sustain losses. This basically was the prevailing practice until the
bankruptcy system was instituted.
Under the PB, once an enterprise is declared bankrupt, all its assets
are frozen. The departments of industrial and commercial administration take over the assets and serve as a trustee for liquidation and distribution. 24' After SEF was declared bankrupt, a "Supervision and Administration Committee" was formed to take charge of SEF's liquidation
and distribution, with a power similar to the liquidation group under the
National Act. 249 The committee consisted of representatives from the de-

239. Wu Xianguang, Guochi De Renshi (Belated Awareness), Shenyang Rebao
[Shenyang Daily], Aug. 4, 1986, at 3 [hereinafter Belated Awareness].
240. Why SEF Going Bankrupt, supra note 236, at 3.
241. Belated Awareness, supra note 239, at 3.
242. Why SEF Going Bankrupt, supra note 236, at 3.
243. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
244. Meng Xiaoyun, Pochan Qishi (Enlightenmentfrom a Bankruptcy Case), People's Daily, May 12, 1986, at 12.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Our City, supra note 23, at 1.
248. Id.
249. Fangbao QixiechangBei Gongshanjiu Chushi Hongpai Xuangao Pochan(SEF
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partments of industrial and commercial administration, labor regulatory
departments, and the assembly of employees' representatives.' 50 The
committee scheduled and appraised all of SEF's assets and decided to put
the entire factory up for auction.2 51 On September 25, 1986, SEF was
sold at a public auction to the Construction Department of Shenyang
Gas Supply Company for 200,000 yuan.25 2 In the meantime, the committee scheduled claims of creditors and prepared for distribution. 5 3
About 120 creditors filed claims totaling about 423,900 yuan against
SEF.2" 4 Proceeds from the sale of the assets plus the realized income
from accounts receivable constituted the bankrupt estate, totaling
222,000 yuan.2"5 The bankrupt estate then was distributed pro rata to
the creditors, each receiving approximately fifty percent of its claims.28 6
The PB directly extends the punitive impact of the bankruptcy to the
employees by providing that employees' salaries be reduced for the first
six months following bankruptcy; afterwards, they may only receive
monthly living allowances.2 5 The PB also provides that management
personnel at the level of general manager or higher do not receive salaries from the date of bankruptcy.2 58 They receive a living allowance
only.2 59 This general rule was applied to the former employees of SEF.
Except for the eleven handicapped and sick employees who were given
special treatment and fifteen others who were allowed to retire, all other
employees were given seventy-five percent of their regular pay for the
first six months after the date of the bankruptcy.28 0 Thereafter they received only a monthly thirty yuan allowance for the next eighteeen
months or until they found another job.261 If an employee had dependents, he could receive an additional fifteen yuan for one dependent,
twenty-five yuan for two dependents, and thirty-five yuan for three deWas Shown 'Red Flag' and Declared Bankrupt), Shenyang Rebao [Shenyang Daily],
Aug. 4, 1986, at 1.
250. Id.
251. Shenyang Fangbao Qixiechang Zongti Paimai (SEF Being Sold As a Whole),
(Xinhua News Agency, news release, Sept. 25, 1986).
252. Id.
253. Shenyang Fangbao Qixiechang Kaishi Changhuan Zhaiwu (SEF Starting To
Pay Back Debts) (Xinhua News Agency, news release, Oct. 17, 1986).
254. Id.

255. Id.
256.
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257. Our City, supra note 23, at 1.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Xing Pingan, supra note 27, at 3.
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pendents, 26 2 but the total he received could not exceed his regular
monthly pay. 6 3 The insurance company of the city took charge of the
distribution of the allowance.264
It is unclear whether the provision for terminating salary payments to
the senior executives actually was implemented. The president serving
the last term was assigned to SEF through administrative order when
SEF was ordered to go through reorganization. 265 The government could
not find anyone willing to take care of the mess, and the SEF employees
refused to elect a president from the managerial staff because of their
lack of trust in management.2 66 When SEF was advertized for leasing,
over thirty people came and looked at SEF, but no one was willing to
take over and operate SEF on a leasing basis. 2 7 This last president un-

dertook a very difficult task and should not be penalized. The committee
decided to review the performance of the three prior presidents and audit
the accounts to determine their responsibilities. 68
The experience of SEF is significant to the developement of a bankruptcy system in China. It demonstrates clearly to Chinese policy-makers the operation of a bankruptcy system and its potential social and
economic impacts. The experience helped to eliminate bias against a
bankruptcy system and to persuade most of the Chinese people to accept
the notion of bankruptcy. It facilitated the legislative process of the national bankruptcy law that was progressing simultaneously with the
bankruptcy proceeding of SEF.26 9 Many provisions of the national bankruptcy legislation could be tested immediately in the ongoing bankruptcy
proceedings. The experience of SEF and the application of the PB to the
case of SEF also provide a sound basis for national lawmakers to predict
with reasonable certainty whether a given provision of the national
bankruptcy law would work. Furthermore, the case of SEF revealed

262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id. Leasing out the state-owned enterprises to operate and receive rent is another experiment going on in Shenyang to rescue and deal with state-owned enterprises
sustaining loss. See infra note 349 and accompanying text.
268. Shenyang Explosion-Proof supra note 232, at 1.
269. See Three Cities, supra note 24, at 1. The significance of the PB to the progress
of the National Act was recognized. According to Mr. Cao Siyuan, the head of the working group for drafting the Act, the experiments in Shenyang as well as other cities already provided the enactment of the National Act with practical experience that would
benefit the national legislation. Id.
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many new issues in the bankruptcy system to the national lawmakers
and thus helped them develop a more comprehensive and effective bankruptcy system. The bankruptcy proceedings of SEF terminated around
November 1, 1986, after the completion of the distribution.'7 About one
month later the Central government promulgated the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law.
V.

BANKRUPTCY LAW GOVERNING FOREIGN INVESTMENT
ENTERPRISES

Bankruptcy law applicable to foreign investment enterprises exists at
present only in the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, and is based primarily on the Shenzhen Act and two pertinent chapters in the Corporation Law. This regime applies to all major foreign investment enterprises
such as wholly foreign-owned enterprises, equity and contractual joint
ventures, including the "Sino-foreign joint stock company," a foreign investment stock corporation established by issuing shares to the general
public. 2 1 The bankruptcy system governing foreign investment enter-

prises is substantially similar to that applicable to purely domestic stateowned enterprises. The following sections highlight special provisions of
the bankruptcy system governing foreign investment enterprises that are
not found in the domestic system discussed above.
A.

Bankruptcy Proceedings

The criteria for bankruptcy under the Shenzhen Act are different
from those of the National Act, but are similar to those of the PB. The
Shenzhen Act uses an asset and debt ratio as the test and provides that a
court may declare a foreign investment enterprise bankrupt if all its assets do not suffice to pay off its debts that mature. 2 This test apparently
excludes enterprises that become insolvent merely because of a shortage
of cash, and it thus represents a stricter standard than that of the Na270. Xing Pingan, supra note 27, at 3.
271. Bankruptcy Regulations of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zones for ForeignRelated Corporations, art. 2, adopted at the 23d Session of the Standing Committee of
the 6th People's Congress of Guangdong Province on Nov. 29, 1986, reprinted in

Shenzhen Tequbao [Shenzhen Special Economic Zone Daily], Dec. 10, 1986, at 2 [hereinafter Shenzhen Act]; Regulations of Foreign-Related Corporations of the Special Economics Zones in Guangdong Province, art. 2, adopted at the 22d Session of the Standing

Committee of the 6th People's Congress of Guangdong Province on Sept. 28, 1986, reprinted in Economic Reporter, Hong Kong, Nov. 10, 1986, at 31-33 [hereinafter Corporation Law].
272.

Shenzhen Act, art. 3.
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tional Act which merely requires a showing that an enterprise has sustained serious losses and is unable to pay off debts that mature. Thus,
under the Shenzhen Act, a creditor may not apply for the court to declare a debtor bankrupt simply because the debtor is unable to pay off
the debts.
Under the Shenzhen Act, the initiation and process of bankruptcy proceedings follow a procedure similar to that of the National Act. The
discrepancies exist in the following areas. First, a voluntary bankruptcy
may be initiated by the debtor under the Shenzhen Act on the basis of a
resolution of the board or the shareholders' meeting without the necessity
of obtaining initial approval from the competent authority in charge as
provided in the National Act.27 3 Second, the Shenzhen Act imposes a
time limit on the bankruptcy proceedings; the period from the declaration of bankruptcy to the termination of the bankruptcy proceedings may
not last longer than 180 days, unless a court decision provides otherwise.27 4 The National Act does not have a similar time limitation. Third,
the Shenzhen Act defines bankruptcy claims in a way significantly different from that of the National Act. Unlike the National Act, which
considers damages for termination of a contract by the liquidation group
bankruptcy claims, 7 5 the Shenzhen Act expressly provides that damages
and penalties for breach of a contract resulting from a declaration of
bankruptcy may not be regarded as bankruptcy claims. 27 ' The Shenzhen
Act further provides that interest accrued from claims after the declaration of bankrutpcy may not be considered claims.2 7 7 This is not clear
under the National Act.
B.

Reorganization and Liquidation Under the Corporation Law

The Corporation Law, which took effect on January 1, 1987, contains
chapters on reorganization and liquidations which apply, among other
things, where a corporation is on the verge of bankruptcy or is declared
bankrupt. 7 8 These rules constitute the only bankruptcy law in this area

273. Id., arts. 7-8. Whether the resolution should be adopted by the board or by the
shareholders' meeting depends on the provisions of the articles of association and also the
provisions of law. For a stock corporation, the Corporation Law expressly requires that a
resolution on reorganzation or liquidation must be approved by the shareholders' meeting. Corporation Law, art. 57.
274. Shenzhen Act, art. 28.
275. National Act, art. 26.

276. Shenzhen Act, art. 34.
277.
278.

Id.
Corporation Law, arts. 106, 107, 128.
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until July 1, 1987, when the Shenzhen Act becomes effective.27 9 Afterwards, these rules, particularly the chapter on reorganization, an area
not provided for in the Shenzhen Act, will be concurrently effective with
the bankruptcy rules provided by the Shenzhen Act. The liquidation
procedure of the Corporation Law will probably be preempted by the
Shenzhen Act for bankruptcy cases in the Shenzhen Special Economic
Zone. This would be the case especially where the procedures of the
Corporation Law are different from those of the Shenzhen Act. The liquidation procedures of the Corporation Law, however, have much
broader application than those of the Shenzhen Act. Unlike the
Shenzhen Act, the Corporation Law applies to all three special economic
zones in Guangdong Province. 280 Further, the liquidation procedure of
the Corporation Law also applies where a corporation voluntarily dissolves for reasons other than bankruptcy.
1. Reorganization Under the Corporation Law
The Corporation Law defines reorganization as adjustments made in
order for a foreign-related corporation in financial difficulty and at the
verge of bankruptcy to recover from difficulties and reestablish normal
business operations."' Corporations allowed to undergo reorganization
must meet one of the four conditions: 1) equipment or technology of the
corporation is advanced; 2) products are urgently needed in Chinese society; 3) there is a large amount of investment and a comparatively long
turn-around period; 4) bankruptcy may result in significant negative
consequences. 28 2 These requirements seem to limit reorganizations only
to those corporations whose survival is beneficial to the national
economy.
Reorganization must be approved by the competent department at a
higher level directly in charge of the corporation.2"8 To apply for reorganization, the applicant must report the financial situation of the corporation. This includes submitting a balance sheet and statement of losses
and profits, and the applicant must explain the justification for the reorganization and propose a plan to carry it out.2 The competent department will render its decision within thirty days after receiving the appli-

279.
280.
281.
282.
283.

Shenzhen Act, art. 59.
Corporation Law, art. 1.
Id., art. 106.
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284. Id., art. 109.

722

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 19:683

cation.2" 5 The Corporation Law does not seem to provide an opportunity
for the creditors to have a voice in whether a corporation should go
through reorganization.
Within fifteen days after the reorganization is approved, the shareholders' meeting or the board shall establish a reorganization group consisting of three to five persons.28 6 The board or the shareholders' meeting
shall appoint the head of the group. 2 7 Shareholders, directors and other
outside specialists all may become members of the group.288 The reorganization group will take over the management of the corporation, including the power of the board, and represent the corporation in its dealings with third parties.2 89
The Corporation Law provides that the competent department in
charge and the creditors each may appoint one or two reorganization
supervisors. 2 0 The supervisors representing creditors are appointed
based on the agreement of the creditors.29 1 If such an agreement fails,
the creditors that represent a comparatively larger amount of the credits
have the right to make the appointment.2 92 The Corporation Law does
not further specify in quantitative terms the meaning of "comparatively
larger amount." The reorganization supervisors participate in the reorganization on a regular basis. When the reorganization group disposes of
corporation assets or concludes contracts on behalf of the corporation
with a third party, it must obtain consent from the reorganization supervisors.2" Further, the making and implementing of the reorganization
plan must also be approved by the reorganization supervisor.29 4 If reorganization supervisors cannot reach an agreement, the competent department at a higher level shall make a determination. 9 5 Since one of the
supervisors is actually appointed by the competent department, this rule
in fact allows the opinion of the supervisor appointed by the competent
department to prevail. The reorganization plan will provide for restruc-

285. Id., art. 110.
286. Id., art. 111. Whether the board or the shareholders' meeting has the power to
elect the reorganization group depends on the articles of association and the pertinent

provisions of the law.
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turing of the debts including the postponement of repayment and possibly forgiving of debts; 2 6 this procedure, therefore, may actually lead to
the modification of creditors' rights without their consent.
The reorganization plan shall provide the financial situation of the
company, the modification of the rights of the creditors and shareholders;
the disposal of the assets, the recovery of the claims and payment of
debts; the method of raising funds; the changes in the scale of production
or service; modifications of the articles of association; adjustment in the
management and in the number of employees; and other matters.2 97 The
reorganization plan must be approved by the shareholders' meeting or
the board as the case may be, and be reported to the competent department for recording.2 8 The reorganization plan must be carried out
within 180 days.299
The persons in charge of the reorganization, including the reorganization supervisors, are liable if they violate laws or are guilty of serious
negligence, resulting in economic losses of the corporation. 0 0
2.

Liquidation Under the Corporation Law

Under the Corporation Law, liquidation will take place if a corporation is declared bankrupt by a court order." 1 The liquidation is in the
charge of a liquidation group of three persons which shall be established
within thirty days after the court order.30 2 The court appoints the liquidation group.303 The liquidation group has the power to convene meetings of the creditors and meetings of the board of directors or shareholders, take charge of the assets of the corporation, prepare the balance
sheet and schedule of assets. 304 It also has the authority to continue to
operate the business, prepare the liquidation plan, liquidate and dispose
of the company's assets, recover credits and pay off debts, distribute the
assets and represent the company in lawsuits and other activities.30 5 The

296.

Id., art. 114.

297.

Id.

298.

Id., art. 115.

299. Id.
300. Id., art. 118.
301. Id., art. 128 (iv).
302.

Id., art. 130.

303.

Id. The court appoints the liquidation group only when the liquidation is the

result of a court order, such as a bankruptcy order. This rule does not apply if the

liquidation results from voluntary dissolution.
304.

Id., art. 133.

305.

Id.
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liquidation group's decision-making is based on consensus. 30 6 Where the
liquidation group cannot reach consensus, the court will make a
30 7
decision.
Within ten days after the group is established, the liquidation group
must make a public announcement on the liquidation in the local newspaper and notify the creditors in writing to report claims. 8 ' The liquidation group shall propose a plan of liquidation to be approved by the
court.309 The creditors' meeting apparently has the power to consider
and comment on the plan, but, unlike the National Act, may not reject
310
the plan.
The liquidated assets of a corporation are to be distributed in an order
similar to that of the National Act: 1) expenses incurred during the liquidation; 2) employees' salary and social insurance; 3) tax; 4) debts; and
5) shareholders or other parties holding an equity interest. 1 ' Where the
assets are not sufficient for the distribution among the parties in the
same order, the payment shall be pro rata. 1 2 Shareholders and other
parties holding equity interests may receive a distribution only after all
other expenses have been paid. 3 The distribution among them can be
made either in accordance with their shares of equity interest or the proportion agreed in advance in the contract or in the articles of
31 4
association.
In the case of a "cooperative corporation," that is, a contractual joint
venture, if the debts of the company exceed its assets, each party shall
return the cash distributed to pay the debts of the company in accordance
with the proportion in which the profits are shared.3 15 It is unclear to
what extent the party needs to return distributed cash. Chinese law,
however, provides that the cooperative corporation as a rule is a limited
liability company, meaning each party to the corporation is liable for the
debts of the corporation only to the extent of its capital contribution. 1
Thus, the above rule probably refers only to the situation where the
party has taken cash out of the corporation, with the result that the net

306. Id., art. 134.

307. Id.
308. Id., art, 135.

309. Id., art. 138.
310. Id., art. 137; cf National Act, arts. 15-16.
311.

Corporation Law, art. 140.

312.
313.
314.
315.

Id., art. 141.
Id.
Id., art. 149.

316.

Civil Code, supra note 48, art. 48.
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worth of the company is less than the total of both sides' capital
contribution.
After the liquidation is completed, the liquidation group will report to
the court.311 The liquidation group shall register the dissolution with the
Administration of the Industry and Commerce within fourteen days after
the court approves the liquidation report.31 8
C.

Conciliation Procedure Under the Shenzhen Act

The Shenzhen Act does not provide for reorganization, but it contains
fairly detailed provisions on conciliation. Under the Shenzhen Act, a
debtor may voluntarily apply to the court for conciliation with or without a pending bankruptcy petition against him. 319 The petition for conciliation under the Shenzhen Act does not have to be approved by the
competent authority in charge as required by the National Act, but such
a petition needs to be supported by a resolution of the board or the
shareholders' meetings.3 20 The Shenzhen Act also makes clear that
where a bankrupt proceeding is pending, if the debtor and creditors cannot reach a conciliation agreement, the debtor will be declared
3 21
bankrupt.
After receiving the conciliation petition, the court is required to render
its decision within ten days. 2 2 Under article 10 of the Shenzhen Act, the
court grants conciliation only when debtors and creditors may reach an
agreement on the repayment of the debts. 323 Thus, it seems that the first
step after the filing of the petition for conciliation is to seek an agreement
with the creditors. If the court grants the petition, the court must make a
public announcement of this fact within five days, which shall state the
date of the first meeting of the creditors and the date when the claims are
to be investigated. 24 The public anouncement must also be delivered to
the known creditors as well.3 25 The National Act does not require this
preliminary determination by the court, nor does it contain a similar
notice requirement at this stage.
The Shenzhen Act does not specify who is to propose the conciliation
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318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.

Corporation Law, art. 142.
Id., art. 143.
Shenzhen Act, art. 7.
Id., art. 8.
Id., art. 10.
Id., art. 9.
Id., art. 10.
Id., art. 19.
Id.
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plan; presumably, it is the debtor's obligation to do so. Unlike the National Act, however, the Shenzhen Act specifically requires that a conciliation plan must provide the names of the debtors and creditors, the
amount of the debts; the postponement of payment and the amount of
debts forgiven; the reason for the loss and state of the business and the
plan to improve business performance.3 26 The conciliation plan must be
approved by the meeting of the creditors. 32 7 The Shenzhen Act, however,
provides that the conciliation plan is to be approved by creditors representing fifty percent or more of the total claims, 28 whereas the National
Act requires that the consenting parties must represent at least twothirds of the total unsecured claims.3 29
Once a conciliation plan is approved by the meeting of the creditors,
330
the court must decide whether to confirm the plan within fifteen days.
The creditors that object to the plan must file a lawsuit within seven
days,331 a provision identical to that of the National Act. 32
The implementation of a conciliation plan in fact will lead the corporation into a period of reorganization. The contents of a conciliation plan
required under the Shenzhen Act are substantially similar to those of a
reorganization plan provided in the Corporation Law. The Shenzhen
Act, however, does not expressly provide that after conciliation is approved reorganization will ensue. It is thus unclear what the relationship
is between the "reorganization" provided in the Corporation Law and
the conciliation procedure under the Shenzhen Act.
During the period when a conciliation procedure is effective, the
debtor is prohibited from transferring his assets without consideration
and conducting other acts, though with consideration, which are beyond
the scope of normal business operations. 3 3 The National Act also contains a similar requirement.3 34
The Shenzhen Act authorizes the court to revoke its confirmation of
the conciliation plan and immediately declare the debtor bankrupt if one
of the following occurs. First, the conciliation plan damages the interest
of the creditors that do not participate in the meeting of the creditors,
and the aggrieved party petitions to the court within ten days after the
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330.
331.
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333.
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Id., art. 21.
Id., art. 20.
Id., art. 18.
National Act, art. 16.
Shenzhen Act, art. 25.
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See National Act, art. 16.
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court confirms the plan. 33 5 Second, the debtor commits fraud in connection with the conciliation, and the fraud is discovered within six months
after the plan is confirmed.3 3 Third, the debtor refuses to, or is unable
to, carry out the conciliation plan, and the revocation of confirmation is
based on a petition by the creditors representing fifty percent or more of
the total unsecured claims.33 The National Act reflects a similar
approach. 3 "
D. Liquidation Committee and Meeting of the Creditors Under the
Shenzhen Act
Similar to the National Act, the Shenzhen Act authorizes the court to
appoint the liquidation committee consisting of three to five members;
the Shenzhen Act, however, further requires that one member of the
committee must be an accountant registered in the PRC.33 9 This is in
contrast with the provisions of the Corporation Law that the liquidation
group shall consist of only three persons appointed by the court. 340 The
Shenzhen Act does not provide whether the committee shall include a
foreigner. The emphasis on the nationality of the accountant, however,
indicates that a foreign party would probably be allowed to serve in the
committee.
The Shenzhen Act increases the authority of the liquidation committee
by allowing the committee to assume an active role from the very beginning of the bankruptcy proceedings. Under article 22, the court should
establish a liquidation committee within ten days after the court decides
to hear the case, whereas under the National Act, the court should estab341
lish a liquidation group only after the enterprise is declared bankrupt.
Thus, the liquidation group does not exist during the period of conciliation or reorganization under the National Act, but the liquidation committee under the Shenzhen Act is authorized to perform a leading role in
the conciliation procedure as well. 2 In all other areas, the liquidation
committee under the Shenzhen Act performs functions similar to those of

335. Shenzhen Act, art. 26.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. See National Act, arts. 21, 35.
339. Shenzhen Act, art. 12.
340. Corporation Law, art. 130.
341. National Act, art. 24.
342. The Shenzhen Act authorizes the liquidation committee to supervise the making
and implementation of the conciliation plan, and to investigate and examine the business
operation of the corporation during the conciliation. See Shenzhen Act, art. 14.
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the liquidation group under the National Act.
The meeting of the creditors under the Shenzhen Act has a similar
role as that of the National Act. The Shenzhen Act does not specify,
however, the persons who are qualified to be a member of the meeting of
the creditors. Presumably, a meeting of creditors shall include all the
creditors. The Shenzhen Act also fails, unlike the National Act, to provide for what kinds of creditors have voting rights, but it implicitly indicates that only the unsecured creditors may ote, a rule identical to that
of the National Act.34 3 The Shenzhen Act does not provide a quorum

requirement, but it does provide a procedural rule: the adoption of a
conciliation plan or distribution plan must be approved by the creditors
present at the meeting, representing fifty percent or more of the total
unsecured claims.344 This rule is in contrast with a similar rule of the
National Act requiring that a resolution be adopted by a simple majority
of creditors as well as by the creditors representing certain amount of the
claims; 3

45

the rule thus enables a relatively larger number of creditors

representing a small amount of claims to block a decision imposed by a
small number of creditors even though they represent an overwhelming
majority in terms of the amount of the claims. The above voting rules of
the Shenzhen Act apply only to the adoption of a resolution on the conciliation plan and on the distribution plan." It does not expressly provide procedures for the meeting of creditors to adopt other actions.
The Shenzhen Act requires the liquidation committee to obtain consent from the meeting of creditors with respect to the following actions:
transfer of real estate, trademark, patents and negotiable instruments;
borrowings, performance of contracts, abandonment of claims, and lawsuits concerning the dispute over the bankruptcy estate. 4 The National
Act does not accord similar veto rights to the meeting of the creditors.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The establishment of a bankruptcy system in China represents an important step forward in economic reform. Its effective implementation
will provide a greater incentive for enterprises and employees to excel
and add new momentum to the progress of the national economy. A
bankruptcy system will also stimulate further development of economic
reform in many other related areas. Although the bankruptcy system
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344.
345.
346.
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See National Act, art. 13; Shenzhen Act, art. 18.
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Id., art. 42.

19861

CHINESE BANKRUPTCY LAW

based on the National Act applies only to state-owned enterprises and
other bankruptcy laws only have limited geographic application, developments in the past several years in the area of bankruptcy law suggest
that it is only a matter of time before a comprehensive bankruptcy system applicable to all business entities will emerge. 4 The limited application of the current bankruptcy system will provide experience and expertise to the benefit of a more comprehensive bankruptcy system to be
developed.
While the bankruptcy system definitely will generate telling pressure
on enterprises, it probably will not have a disruptive impact on the economic system or cause confusion and instability within Chinese society.
Indeed, the bankruptcy system does not totally replace the existing practice. The state remains the owner of state-owned enterprises. The National Act also does not prevent the state from providing financial support to its enterprises to avoid bankruptcy. Nor does the National Act
take away the power of the state to close, terminate or change the product line of an enterprise through administrative means. Although the
National Act is a clear indication that this practice will be more limited
with the operation of a bankruptcy system, the state can continue to use
subsidies and administrative means to control and limit the magnitude
and the number of bankrupt enterprises, if necessary. This residual
power is very important to maintain the viability of the new bankruptcy
system. It will prevent the negative elements of the system from developing to an unmanageable extent and will diminish the influence of those
opposed to a bankruptcy system.
The Chinese Government is also experimenting with other ways to
deal with state-owned business entities that sustain losses on a consistent
basis. One method is to lease the enterprise to individuals or other companies and receive rents. By August 1, 1986, over 60,000 state-owned
department stores and shops were leased, twelve percent of which were
leased to individuals. 4 9 These measures also will help limit the fate of
bankruptcy to those enterprises with little hope of survival, and therefore, diminish the possible disruptive impact, if any, on the economy.
The Chinese bankruptcy system serves to protect the interest of creditors through an institutionalized, equitable distribution of assets among
creditors, adding certainty and predictability to existing economic rela-

348. The National Act was initially drafted to apply to all enterprises. It was later
on revised to apply only to state-owned enterprises. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.

349. Liuwan Yu Guoying Shangdian Shixing Zulinzhi (About Sixty Thousand
State-owned Shops were Leased) (China News Agency, news release, Aug. 1, 1986).
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tions in Chinese society. As in the United States bankruptcy system, the
Chinese system stresses the rehabilitation of the debtor, but this is
achieved through reorganization, not by a discharge of the debtor. A major purpose of the Chinese bankruptcy system is to create a framework
which will allow an enterprise that is not viable economically to die expediently, an alternative that did not exist before. This will impose a
death threat to existing enterprises and allow the state, as a Chinese
newspaper report explained, 350 to terminate the "life support system" of
a "cancer patient" which has absolutely no hope of recovery. Payments
to creditors with the assets of the bankrupt enterprise also discharge the
state from its obligations to creditors. 5
The significance of the Chinese bankruptcy system to foreign businesses is at least three-fold. First, the present bankruptcy system has
already directly touched a small number of foreign investment enterprises located in the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone. The government
likely will expand the scope of the present system in the near future to
encompass all foreign investment enterprises as well. 5 2 Some adjustment
will be needed, but probably without any significant modifications. Second, the bankruptcy system provides some basic guidelines for handling
debtor-creditor relationships and therefore allows more room for business planning. For instance, both the National Act and the Shenzhen Act
allow the property that is in the possession of the debtor and that does
not belong to the debtor to be recovered prior to the bankruptcy liquidation. This rule clearly indicates that a rent-to-own transaction that allows the lessor to retain title until the purchase price of the property is
fully paid in the form of rent gives greater protection to the creditor than
direct sale under seller's financing. Third, the bankruptcy system makes
clear that Chinese businesses, including state-owned enterprises, are independent business entities and that the state will not shoulder the financial losses of those enterprises that become insolvent. As a high-ranking
Chinese official explained to the sixteenth session of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, one of the purposes of the National Act is to provide rules for dealing with debt and credit problems in

350. Belated Awareness, supra note 239, at 3. The author of this report called SEF,
an enterprise declared bankrupt, as having a "cancer," the support through administrative means as "blood transmission" from the healthy enterprises and "changing
mothers." Id.
351. For the obligations of state-owned enterprises, state is only liable to the third
party within the limit of the assets the enterprise owns and operates. See Zheng, supra
note 48, at 680.
352. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
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foreign economic relations. 5 The author of an article published in an
influential Chinese newspaper reasoned:
Because China has not enacted an enterprise bankruptcy law, Chinese
enterprises are often placed in a disadvantageous position concerning foreign related claims. Foreign businesses often demand that the state shoulder unlimited joint liability for a state-owned enterprise ....

With enact-

ment of a bankruptcy law [and] the limit of bankrupt enterprises' assets,
the principles for the compensation to the creditors and liquidation of assets will be clearly provided by law. This will provide laws to be followed
in dealing with foreign related claims, which will be of importance to protecting the state's interest and developing international economic
exchanges.

5"

For this reason, the National Act will increase the importance to foreign
investors of examining the credit standing of Chinese business partners.
Theoretically, problems could arise in three areas. First, article 35 of the
National Act makes void certain transactions of a Chinese enterprise that
take place six months prior to the bankruptcy proceedings. As discussed
above, article 35 is designed to prevent the debtor from evading debts to
the detriment of creditors; therefore the article probably will be interpreted strictly where the interest of an innocent third person is involved.3 55 Second, the National Act authorizes the liquidation group to
rescind executory contracts of a bankrupt enterprise, an authority typically entrusted to the trustee under the common law.3 5 6 In some instances, this could affect the business transactions of a foreign business in
China. Actually, enterprises on the verge of bankruptcy or already bankrupt probably would not be able to perform the contract anyway. Furthermore, the National Act expressly entitles the other party to claim
damages for breach of contract from the bankrupt estate.3' 5 Finally, as
stated in the quoted newspaper article by Xiao Zhuoji, the National Act
will prevent the state from shouldering unlimited liability for enterprises
beyond the value of their assets. 35 This provision is in fact a restatement
353. Zhiding Pochanfa Cujin Qiye Gaishan Guanli Youliyu Yifa Chuli Shewai
Jingii Wenti (Enacting a Bankruptcy Law Promoting Enterprise to Improve Management and Benefiting Resolving Foreign-Related Economic Problems) (Xinhua News
Agency, news release, June 16, 1986).

354. Xiao Zhuoji, Zhiding Qiyie Pochan Fa Shizai Bixing (Enactinga Bankruptcy
Law Being Inevitable), Guangming Rebao [Bright Daily],Aug. 2, 1986, at 3.

355. See text accompanying notes 136-38.
356.

National Act, art. 26.

357. The Shenzhen Act does not provide for damages claims. See text accompanying
supra note 276.
358. See text accompanying note 354.
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of a prior law, article 49 of the General Principles of the Civil Law."5 9
In general, the National Act indeed raises an issue of significance in
understanding the credit standing of business partners. It clarifies an important area of Chinese law, the law governing the debtor-creditor relationship. The National Act, however, does not introduce any significant
new concept which entails changes or modifications in existing business
practices. As a practical matter, most Chinese companies in the area of
foreign trade and investment are supported strongly by the state, which
has a great interest in maintaining the credit and reputations of these
companies because any problems of these Chinese companies may have
significant impact on overall foreign economic relations. Thus, the importance of looking into the credit standing of business partners is of
primary concern in the domestic Chinese context.
The Chinese bankruptcy system is at its formative stage. The existing
bankruptcy laws establish only a basic framework, leaving many areas to
be developed through later legislative and judicial practice. The entire
text of the National Act and the Shenyuan Act each takes only one-half
of a page in a Chinese newspaper. Though its length is not unusual in
comparison with many other Chinese statutes of comparable significance, 3 60 it does seem short in light of the complexity of a bankruptcy
system involving substantive and procedural issues. The brevity of these
bankruptcy laws inevitably leaves open many issues, some of which can
be significant to the effective and fair implementation of a bankruptcy
system. The eventual development of specific rules and a proper interpretation of the existing provisions will be of fundamental importance
for the bankruptcy system to serve its intended purpose.

359. Civil Code, supra note 48, art. 49; supra note 49 and accompanying text.
360. The National Act is considerably shorter than major codes such as the General
Principles of Civil Law, the Criminal Law, and Civil Procedure Law. It is comparable
in length to Inheritance Law, Marriage Law and longer than most of the tax statutes,
contract statutes and most of the statutes in the area of foreign economic relations.

